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I. "MOBBING": AN ALTERNATIVE PARADIGM OF HARASSMENT
"Mobbing" has never carried a positive connotation in U.S. law, although
its meaning has shifted over the years. Before the Civil War, "mobbing" was
what Southern rioters did to intimidate abolitionists, and the South's violent
rioting style apparently led to the North's increased revulsion towards slavery.'
Only a handful of American cases have used the term "mobbing" since the
Civil War, but its basic meaning remained largely the same until recently:
dangerous, unruly crowds physically threatening or attacking the vulnerable,
who are often racial minorities. In re Grand Jury,2 an 1886 case that deplored
anti-Chinese mobbing, is illustrative. Judge Deady described mobbing as "an
evil spirit.., abroad in this land.... It tramples down the law of the country
and fosters riot and anarchy."3 He continued:
Lawless and irresponsible associations of persons are forming all
over the country, claiming the right to impose their opinions upon
others, and to dictate for whom they shall work, and whom they
shall hire; from whom they shall buy, and to whom they shall
sell, and for what price or compensation.... Freedom, law, and
order are so far subverted, and a tyranny is set up in our midst
most gross and galling. Nothing like it has afflicted the world
since the Middle Ages, when the lawless barons and their brutal
followers desolated Europe with their private wars and predatory
raids, until the husbandman was driven from his ravaged field,
and the artisan from his pillaged shop, and the fair land became
a waste.4
Today, the term "mobbing" is reentering American jurisprudence, albeit
with a different connotation.5 Although a "many-against-one" dynamic
Christopher Waldrep, Book Review, 19 LAW & HIST. REv. 208, 209 (2001) (reviewing
DAVID GRIMSTED, AMERICAN MOBBING, 1828-1861: TOWARD CIVIL WAR (1998)).
2 26 F. 749 (D. Or. 1886).
Id. at 749.
4 Id. at 750.
5 For legal scholarship that discusses mobbing in its contemporary form, see Brady
Coleman, Pragmatism's Insult: The Growing Interdisciplinary Challenge to American
Harassment Jurisprudence, 8 EMP. RTs. & EMP. POL'YJ. 239 (2004); Rosa Ehrenreich, Dignity
and Discrimination: Toward a Pluralistic Understanding of Workplace Harassment, 88 GEO.
L.J. 1 (1999); Gabrielle S. Friedman & James Q. Whitman, The European Transformation of
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remains part of its core meaning, the elements of physical violence and
passionate crowds have been replaced with subtle psychological aggression,
which is typically carried out over a long period of time in workplaces,
schools, and other institutions. Mobbing was a major focus of the meeting of
the labor and employment section at the 2004 annual meeting of the
Association of American Law Schools.' The first panelist at that meeting,
Gabrielle Friedman, defined mobbing as "the persistent and systematic attempt
to destroy someone's social standing at work."'  Friedman summarizes
"mobbing theory" as founded on an "employee's right to respectful treatment
at work, rather than her right to equal treatment."9  The Department of
Environmental Quality for the State of Oregon has established the first explicit
anti-mobbing policy in the United States.'0 Efforts to add new anti-mobbing
Harassment Law: Discrimination Versus Dignity, 9 COLUM. J. EuR. L. 241 (2003); Maria Isabel
S. Guerrero, The Development of Moral Harassment (or Mobbing) Law in Sweden and France
as a Step Towards EU Legislation, 27 B.C. INT'L & COmP. L. REv. 477 (2004); Vicki Schultz
et al., Global Perspectives on Workplace Harassment Law: Proceedings of the 2004 Annual
Meeting, Association of American Law Schools Section on Labor Relations and Employment
Law, 8 EMP. RTs. & EMP. POL'Y J. 151 (2004); James Q. Whitman, Enforcing Civility and
Respect: Three Societies, 109 YALE L.J. 1279 (2000) [hereinafter Whitman, Enforcing Civility];
James Q. Whitman, The Two Western Cultures of Privacy: Dignity Versus Liberty, 113 YALE
L.J. 1151 (2004) [hereinafter Whitman, Two Western Cultures]; David C. Yamada, The
Phenomenon of "Workplace Bullying" andthe Needfor Status-BlindHostile WorkEnvironment
Protection, 88 GEO. L.J. 475 (2000).
6 Scottish law continues to use the more archaic definition in its criminal law: "mobbing and
rioting" include "all those convocations of the lieges for violent and unlawful purposes, which
are attended with injury to the persons or property of the lieges, or terror and alarm to the
neighborhood in which it takes place." ARCHIBALD ALISON, PRINCIPLES OF THE CRIMINAL LAW
OF SCOTLAND 509 (Butterworth Legal Publishing 1990) (1832). Alison adds that the terms
"rioting" and "mobbing" have distinct meanings: "the word mobbing being peculiarly applicable
to the unlawful assemblage and violence of a number of persons, and that of rioting to the
outrageous behaviour of a single individual." Id.
Schultz et al., supra note 5, at 154.
8 Id. at 156. Friedman also defines mobbing as
a situation where a particular employee is singled out for abuse. Mobbing
could lead to what we would call a constructive discharge, but it doesn't have
to. The point is that conditions are intentionally made intolerable for the
employee to the point where he or she can no longer function in the job.
Id. at 154.
9 Id. at 155.
" State of Oregon, Dep't Envtl. Quality, Anti-Mobbing Policy, No. 50.110 (Sept. 19,2002),
available at http://mobbing-usa.com/R_legal.html#Four.
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legislation have recently been attempted in California, Hawaii, Oklahoma, and
Oregon. "
Heinz Leymann, a Swedish academic who devoted his career to the issue,
offers the following case study from Europe as a typical illustration of
mobbing:
A canteen supervisor at a large prison went into retirement and
a successor was needed. The prospective employer and the
personnel department were of the same opinion: the opportunity
should be used to bring about certain changes. The canteen
needed to economize and at the same time offer healthier food.
An individual with suitable training was found. She was
employed and assigned to the kitchen where six female cooks -
who all knew very well how to prepare a thick cream sauce but
nothing about the impending changes - were standing in front
of their ovens.
An inevitable conflict soon broke out. How was the new
manager in the kitchen going to pursue the desired changes
without the support of her employer? Nobody had informed the
cooks of any planned change except the new manager herself.
The new methods for preparing the food were totally strange to
them. The idea of making provision for a relevant training course
had never dawned on the employer. The cooks believed that all
these new ideas came personally from Eve, their new supervisor.
This caused them to turn against her. They started to gossip and
counteract her instructions. Even the fact that she had a mentally
handicapped child was held against her, as if her own character
were responsible for this. There were continuous heated
discussions. The cooks, not being willing to listen to Eve and her
delegation of assignments, regularly took measures that resulted
in differences of opinion. It was maintained that Eve went far
beyond the scope of her responsibility, which in fact, was not
true.
On a number of occasions, Eve tried to obtain descriptions of
her responsibilities from the prison authorities. Top management
refused her requests and her continual requests were interpreted
David C. Yamada, Crafting a Legislative Response to Workplace Bullying, 8 EMP. RTs.
& EMP. POL'Y J. 475, 476 (2004).
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as insubordination. Here we should bear in mind, that job
descriptions of this nature are, in fact, a method through which
top management can express it's [sic] leadership at all levels! By
defining institutional hierarchy at a central level, and defining
various areas of responsibility, an employer is provided with an
indispensable control mechanism through which the various areas
of responsibility can be influenced. In Eve's case, the only thing
that happened was that top management felt attacked by her
requests and defended themselves. This legitimized the cooks'
harassment of Eve as they interpreted the situation as if the top
management were "on their side." The harassment continued and
developed into a serious mobbing process, whereby Eve
eventually completely lost her authority. Harsh arguments took
place on a daily basis. One of the top managers who accidentally
overheard such an argument, called Eve for a report. As she
entered the meeting room, she noticed, that she was standing in
front of some kind of court, where she was given no chance to
explain the situation, but was heavily criticized. Top
management ordered her to take a sick leave, which the prison's
own physician validated. After having been on sick leave for
more than two years, Eve eventually lost her job. She never
found another job again.12
In an attempt to establish a definition for "mobbing," one organ of the
European Parliament defines the German verb "mobben" as the "persistent
torment of colleagues (with the intention to dispel them from their posts)."13
In the early 1970s, a Swedish physician first used the term to describe hostile
behavior observed among schoolchildren. 4 Some of the newfound attention
to mobbing never mentions the word because it goes by so many other
terms-psychological terrorism, workplace or school bullying, campus hate
speech, emotional abuse, etc. 5 Perhaps unsurprisingly, the concept struggles
2 Heinz Leymann, The Mobbing Encyclopedia: Bullying; Whistleblowing, http://www.
leymann.se/English/14100E.HTM (last visited Nov. 11, 2006).
"3 Frank Lorho & Ulrich Hilp, Bullying at Work 7 (Eur. Parliament, Directorate-Gen. for
Research, Working Paper No. 108,2001), available at http://www.europari.europa.eu/working
papers/soci/pdf/1 08en.pdf.
14 Guerrero, supra note 5, at 480.
15 A point about terminology: for purposes of this Article, "mobbing" is equivalent to "non-
status-based" harassment, the "European approach," and "generic" harassment. "Status-based"
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against an accusation of triviality-as most of us routinely endure varieties of
social aggression or insult, of course, and it is sometimes difficult to discern
when inevitable workplace conflicts reach the level of psychological
destruction needed to qualify as mobbing. On the other hand, it has been
argued that a powerful dynamic prevents a candid evaluation of mobbing from
reaching personal and public consciousness. 6
Major American print media's attention to mobbing has been uneven. In
2000, Newsweek introduced
an ugly, hitherto little-recognized workplace problem that's as
corrosive as racial discrimination and sexual harassment. They
call it mobbing: repeated attacks that humiliate, isolate and
belittle, to the point where the victim can no longer function.
Mobbing . . . can be perpetrated by bosses, peers or even
subordinates. And it seems to be on the rise.... Mobbing help-
lines run by unions, churches and former victims have popped up
throughout Europe.... Big companies like Volkswagen have
drawn up rules meant to stamp out mobbing. The Swiss Red
harassment is also referred to as "protected category" harassment or the "American approach."
See also Yamada, supra note 11, at 479 ("Regardless of what labels are used, the problem itself
is too serious and costly on both human and organizational levels to be caught up in an academic
debate over naming."). I use the term "harassment" in its broad sense to include harmful verbal
(and symbolic) expression and related conduct, e.g., "fighting words," Title VII "hostile
environment" harassment, campus "hate speech," etc. As my general aim is to consider the
relative psychological harms from a broader set of aggressive expression, I avoid, where
irrelevant for my purposes, the nuanced distinctions made, for example, in First Amendment law
between different contexts (schools, universities, homes, workplaces, captive audiences, etc.).
Cf Frederick Schauer, The Speech-ing of Sexual Harassment, in DIRECTIONS IN SEXUAL
HARASSMENT LAW 357 (Catharine A. MacKinnon & Reva B. Siegel eds., 2004).
Although an important strand ofFirst Amendment doctrine does intentionally
ignore distinctions among institutional settings in the service of the First
Amendment's inherently rule-based approach, it is increasingly the case that
First Amendment doctrine has become somewhat institution-specific,
employing different rules, principles, categories, doctrines, and approaches
in some institutions than it does in others.
Id.
16 See Kenneth Westhues, SAFS and the Darker Forces, SAFS NEWSLETTER (Soc'y for
Acad. Freedom & Scholarship, London, Ontario, Canada), Sept. 2001, at 1-3, available at
http://www.safs.ca/sept2001 .pdf.
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Cross founded a sort of"Mobbees Anonymous," and in Sweden
one can cite mobbing in making health benefit claims.... ,7
The New York Times Sunday Magazine has provided comparatively extensive
coverage, with cover stories devoted to mobbing-related issues in the weekly
magazine in recent years.' A best-selling book titled Mobbing: Emotional
Abuse in the American Workplace has recently been translated into Japanese
and Turkish. 19 The leading American journal on university life, The Chronicle
offHigher Education, exposed the practice amongst academics in a lengthy and
comprehensive article titled "Mob Rule" published in April 2006.20 If one
searches online databases for the term "mobbing," a significant and increasing
amount of attention to the issue is revealed, but a large percentage of such
attention appears in non-American literature.2'
Although the Europeans have enacted legislation against mobbing across
the continent, sometimes even in the form of criminal penalties,22 American
"? Karen Lowry Miller, They call it "Mobbing, " NEWSWEEK, Aug. 14, 2000, at 44.
18 See, e.g., Margaret Talbot, Girls Just Want to Be Mean, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 24, 2002, § 6
(Magazine), at 24; Margaret Talbot, Men Behaving Badly, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 2002, § 6
(Magazine), at 52 ("More broadly, the whole paradigm of sexual harassment, and in particular
its anchoring in discrimination law, is due for reconsideration."); Kenji Yoshino, The Pressure
to Cover, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 15, 2006, § 6 (Magazine), at 32. Yoshino states:
In recent decades, discrimination in America has undergone a generational
shift. Discrimination was once aimed at entire groups, resulting in the
exclusion of all racial minorities, women, gays, religious minorities and
people with disabilities.... Now a subtler form of discrimination has risen
to take its place. This discrimination does not aim at groups as a whole.
Rather, it aims at the subset of the group that refuses to cover, that is, to
assimilate to dominant norms. And for the most part, existing civil rights
laws do not protect individuals against such covering demands. The question
of our time is whether we should understand this new discrimination to be a
harm and, if so, whether the remedy is legal or social in nature.
19 NOA DAVENPORT ET AL., MOBBING: EMOTIONAL ABUSE IN THE AMERICAN WORKPLACE
(2002).
2 John Gravios, Mob Rule, 52 CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. 10 (2006), available at http://
chronicle.com/free/v52/i32/32a01001 .htm.
2" When references to mobbing do appear in American legal journals, it may be because
European professors themselves raise the issue during, for example, published conference
proceedings held in the U.S. See, e.g., Stefano Zamagni, Keynote Address, Religious Values and
Corporate Decision Making: An Economist's Perspective, 11 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 573,
596 (2006). Even as late as 2006, the Italian professor likely left much of his American audience
baffled by his reference to the "dirty" practice of "mobbing."
22 That legislation is summarized in The European Parliament's Directorate-General for
Research, which recently published a comprehensive study of mobbing. See Lorho & Hilp,
20061
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
jurisprudence and public awareness are in their infancy.23 Still, analogies to
mobbing regulations undoubtedly exist across the landscape of American law,
from Title VII hostile environment jurisprudence, to the common law tort of
intentional infliction of emotional distress, to university conduct codes, and so
on.24 Title VII, an anti-discrimination statute, has been interpreted to protect
against workplace "hostile environment" harassment based on sex, race,
religion, or national origin. 25 Harassment claims under Title VII must be
because of one of these four protected categories-a requirement that has
engendered much judicial confusion and scholarly commentary.26 Moreover,
the expansion of harassment protection-both inside and outside of Title
VII-adds to the complexity of what categories are included for purposes of
considering "status-based" psychological harm.2 7 Jurisdictions or judicial
decisions currently prohibit harassment based on a multifarious array of
supra note 13. For good English-language summaries of current developments in Europe, see
VITTORIO DI MARTINO ET AL., EUR. FOUNDATION FOR THE IMPROVEMENT OF LIVING AND
WORKING CONDmONS, PREVENTING VIOLENCE AND HARASSMENT IN THE WORKPLACE (2002),
available at http://www.eurofound.eu.int/pubdocs/2002/109/en/l/efD2l09en.pdf; Linda Shallcross,
The Workplace Mobbing Syndrome, Response and Prevention in the Public Sector (Oct. 16,2003)
(unpublished paper, presented at Workplace Bullying Conference, Brisbane, Australia, available
at http://members.shaw.ca/mobbing/mobbingCA/mobsyndrome-1 .htm.
23 This Article distinguishes an American approach from a European approach, for
simplicity's sake. But a more global perspective would reveal that other countries (Australia,
Canada, etc.) are also developing a European-style "mobbing" approach to harassment. Yamada,
supra note 5; Coleman, supra note 5.
24 Yamada, supra note 5; Coleman, supra note 5. See also Mark McLaughlin Hager,
Harassment as a Tort: Why Title VII Hostile Environment Liability Should Be Curtailed, 30
CONN. L. REV. 375,432 (1998) (suggesting expanding intentional infliction of emotional distress
(IIED) or other tortious remedies to improve protection against harassment); William R. Corbett,
The Need for a Revitalized Common Law of the Workplace, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 91 (2003)
(opposing non-status-based anti-harassment legislation such as that proposed by Yamada, but
sympathetic to broader common law remedies for mobbed employees).
25 See Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
26 See generally Katherine M. Franke, What's Wrong with Sexual Harassment?, 49 STAN.
L. REV. 691, 693 (1997); Linda Kelly Hill, The Feminist Misspeak of Sexual Harassment, 57
FLA. L. REV. 133 (2005); Vicki Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, 107 YALE L.J.
1683, 1686 (1998).
27 See, e.g., Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs. Inc., 523 U.S. 75 (1998) (holding same-
sex harassment actionable).
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categories, including use of a guide animal,"8 transsexualism,29 source of
income,3" whether children occupy one's apartment,3 and so on. Graduate
students at the University of Massachusetts at Amherst wanted to add to their
harassment code "citizenship, culture, HIV status, language, parental status,
political affiliation or belief, and pregnancy status. 32 Some school codes have
prohibited harassment based on "hobbies," "clothing," "social skills," etc.33
First Amendment scholar Eugene Volokh has listed the following
comprehensive list of harassment-protected categories:
race, religion, sex, national origin, age, disability (including
obesity), military membership or veteran status, or, in some
jurisdictions, sexual orientation, marital status, transsexualism or
cross-dressing, political affiliation, criminal record, prior
psychiatric treatment, occupation, citizenship status, personal
appearance, "matriculation," tobacco use outside work,
Appalachian origin, receipt of public assistance, or dishonorable
discharge from the military.3 4
In any case, to paint with a broad brush, U.S. law conceptually divides
harassment into different categories, some of which receive protection (or
greater protection), and some of which do not. The U.S. version is sometimes
termed the "status-based" approach to harassment. The Europeans, on the
other hand, typically have status-based protection as a later or supplemental
guarantee of some form or another, but in terms of actual enforcement and
28 Pennsylvania Human Relations Act, 43 PA. CONS. STAT. § 955 (1955) (banning public
accommodations harassment on the basis of race, color, religion, national origin, ancestry, age
(forty and above), sex, disability, use of a guide animal, or having a GED instead of a high
school diploma).
29 See Miles v. N.Y. Univ., 979 F. Supp. 248, 249 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (holding that Title IX
prohibits sexual harassment of a transsexual woman).
30 In a Chicago case, the city's Commission on Human Relations found that speaking to a
customer in a "derogatory manner" because he was a ticket broker-someone who legally
scalped tickets--constituted public accommodations harassment based on "source of income."
See Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech, Cyberspace, and Harassment Law, 2001 STAN. TECH.
L. REv. 3 n.79 (citing In re Plochl, No. 92-PA-46 (Chi. Comm'n Hum. Rel.)).
31 SANTA MONICA MUN. CODE § 4.56.020 (1995).
32 TIMOTHY C. SHIELL, CAMPUS HATE SPEECH ON TRIAL 12 (1998).
" Saxe v. State College Area Sch. Dist., 240 F.3d 200,203 (3d Cir. 2001) (holding this code
unconstitutional on First Amendment grounds).
34 Eugene Volokh, What Speech Does "Hostile Work Environment" Harassment Law
Restrict?, 85 GEO. L.J. 627 (1997).
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public imagination, the Europeans view harassment as a non-status-based
phenomenon, and focus on "mobbing" or a synonymous concept, like that of
"moral harassment" in France.35 Many American scholars (if not most U.S.
lawyers and laypersons) are increasingly recognizing the explicit challenge
posed by European mobbing laws. James Q. Whitman writes:
The importance of the value of respect in continental law is most
familiar to Americans from one body of law in particular: the
continental law of hate speech, which protects minorities against
disrespectful epithets. But the continental attachment to norms
of respect goes well beyond hate speech. Minorities are not the
only ones protected against disrespectful epithets on the
Continent. Everybody is protected against disrespect, through the
continental law of "insult," a very old body of law that protects
the individual right to "personal honor." Nor does it end there.
Continental law protects the right of workers to respectful
treatment by their bosses and coworkers, through what is called
the law of "mobbing" or "moral harassment. ,36
A growing body of literature, from the law and other disciplines, has
attempted to explain the reasons for this different approach to harassment
taken by the United States and Europe.37 The focus of the present article is
quite limited, and the next part (Part II) focuses on only one of those
reasons-that the psychic harm from "status-based" harassment (again,
harassment based on sex, race, religion, etc.) is more severe than the harm
from "non-status-based" or "generic" harassment. Not everyone agrees with
35 See generally, supra note 5.
36 Whitman, Two Western Cultures, supra note 54, at 1164-65. For the most thorough
discussion of the historical (and ancient) significance of "honor" and "insult" in European law,
see Whitman, Two Western Cultures, supra note 5, at 1164-71. See also Elena Yanchukova,
Comment, Criminal Defamation and Insult Laws: An Infringement on the Freedom of
Expression in European and Post-Communist Jurisdictions, 41 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 861
(2003); Whitman, Enforcing Civility, supra note 5; Friedman & Whitman, supra note 5.
" See generally supra note 5; see also Susanne Baer, Dignity or Equality?, Responses to
Workplace Harassment in European, German and US. Law, in DIRECTIONS IN SEXUAL
HARASSMENT LAW, supra note 15, at 582; KATHRIN S. ZIPPEL, THE POLITICS OF SEXUAL
HARASSMENT: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE UNITED STATES, THE EUROPEAN UNION, AND
GERMANY (2006); Frank Dobbin, Do the Social Sciences Shape Corporate Anti-Discrimination
Practice?: The United States and France, 23 COMP. LAB. L. & POL'Y J. 829 (2002).
[Vol. 35:53
SHAME, RAGE AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH
this claim.38 Indeed, many scholars have expressed open skepticism about it.
The Article elaborates on a hypothesis: that the dispute could benefit from a
distinction between two core emotional responses to harassment, shame and
rage. Neither emotion is normally characterized as positively felt, but the
claim furthered in Part H is that as a general principle, "status-based"
harassment is more likely to generate rage rather than shame, and that shame
is a more psychologically harmful emotion. The hypothesis is then rebutted
(Part III), but the Article ultimately concludes (Part IV) that the dispute is best
bypassed because the free speech advantages of mobbing laws trump other
concerns, including those over comparative psychological harm.39
II. THE CLAIM: STATUS-BASED HARASSMENT IS NOT MORE
PSYCHOLOGICALLY HARMFUL
A. The Claim by the Supreme Court
The Supreme Court clashed over the general question of comparative
psychological harm from status-based "fighting words" more than a decade
ago in R.A. V. v. City of St. Paul.40 In particular, Justice Scalia and Justice
Stevens fought over the relative emotional trauma caused by racist, sexist, etc.,
language, as opposed to the damage from communicative assaults that fall
outside of such typically protected categories.4 Justice Scalia's opinion
disputed any claim of greater psychological harm from the categories listed in
the challenged ordinance. In R.A. V, the City of St. Paul had enacted an
ordinance that forbade placing objects, symbols, etc. (specifically including a
38 See discussion infra Part Il1.
9 Quite a lot has been written about the general harms of sexual, racial, and religious
harassment and hate speech. Still, no scholarship has elaborated in significant detail on the
nature and degree of comparative psychological harm posed by mobbing as opposed to "status-
based" harassment, and no one has directly addressed the First Amendment advantages of
mobbing law, per se. This Article initiates an investigation into both issues. Cf Suzy Fox &
Lamont E. Stallworth, Employee Perceptions of Internal Conflict Management Programs and
ADR Processes for Preventing and Resolving Incidents of Workplace Bullying: Ethical
Challenges for Decision-Makers in Organizations, 8 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL'Y J. 375 ("This
study is the first, to the knowledge of the researchers, to empirically examine the potential
relations between the incidence of bullying and the everyday, subtly hostile or demeaning
experiences of members of ethnic and racial groups in the American workplace.").
40 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
4' To be clear, they did not speak to the distinction between shame and rage; that hypothesis,
which is my own, will be elaborated on below.
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burning cross) on private or public property "which one knows or has
reasonable grounds to know arouses anger, alarm or resentment in others on
the basis of race, color, creed, religion or gender."'42 A teenage boy was
charged with violating the ordinance for burning a cross inside the fenced yard
of a black family. The Supreme Court found the St. Paul ordinance facially
unconstitutional, but disagreed bitterly over the rationale for doing so. Four
members of the court joined with Justice Scalia in holding the ordinance
violative of the First Amendment because it was neither content neutral nor
viewpoint neutral.43 Justice Scalia wrote:
the ordinance goes even beyond mere content discrimination, to
actual viewpoint discrimination. Displays containing some
words-odious racial epithets, for example-would be prohibited
to proponents of all views. But "fighting words" that do not
themselves invoke race, color, creed, religion, or
gender-aspersions upon a person's mother, for example-would
seemingly be usable ad libitum in the placards of those arguing
in favor of racial, color, etc., tolerance and equality, but could not
be used by those speakers' opponents.'
Justice Scalia then offered an example to illustrate his point:
One could hold up a sign saying ...that all "anti-Catholic
bigots" are misbegotten; but not that all "papists" are, for that
would be insult and provoke violence "on the basis of religion."
St. Paul has no such authority to license one side of a debate to
fight freestyle, while requiring the other to follow Marquis of
Queensbury Rules.45
The concurring Justices agreed that the ordinance was unconstitutional, but
on the alternative grounds that it was overbroad, rather than because of any
lack of content or viewpoint neutrality.' Justice Stevens authored one of three
minority concurring opinions, arguing that the psychological injuries from
42 R.A. V., 505 U.S. at 377.
43 Id. at 377-96.
44 Id. at 391 (emphasis in original).
45 Id. at 391-92.
46 Id. at 397 (White, J., concurring).
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status-based communication are more severe: "Threatening someone because
of her race or religious beliefs may cause particularly severe trauma...
And later, Stevens claims:
St. Paul's City Council may determine that threats based on the
target's race, religion, or gender cause more severe harm to both
the target and to society than other threats. This latter
judgment-that harms caused by racial, religious, and gender-
based invective are qualitatively different from that caused by
other fighting words-seems to me eminently reasonable and
realistic.48
Justice Scalia directly responded to this point:
Despite the fact that the Minnesota Supreme Court and St. Paul
acknowledge that the ordinance is directed at expression of group
hatred, Justice Stevens suggests that this "fundamentally
misreads" the ordinance. It is directed, he claims, not to speech
of a particular content, but to particular "injuries" that are
"qualitatively different" from other injuries."
After labeling this distinction mere "wordplay," Scalia continues:
What makes the anger, fear, sense of dishonor, etc., produced by
violation of this ordinance distinct from the anger, fear, sense of
dishonor, etc., produced by other fighting words is nothing other
than the fact that it is caused by a distinctive idea, conveyed by
a distinctive message. The First Amendment cannot be evaded
that easily.5"
Justice Stevens then responds:
The Court contends that this distinction is "wordplay".... This
analysis fundamentally miscomprehends the role of "race, color,
4' Id. at 416 (Stevens, J., concurring).
48 Id. at 424.
41 Id. at 392 (majority opinion).
50 Id. at 392-93.
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creed, religion [and] gender" in contemporary American society.
One need look no further than the recent social unrest in the
Nation's cities to see that race-based threats may cause more
harm to society and to individuals than other threats.5
B. The Claim by Legal Scholars
Justice Scalia's view is shared by some legal scholars who have claimed
that race or gender-based harassment should not be treated as emotionally
exceptional.
David Goldberger agrees with Scalia's analysis:
[I]t is difficult to see how a judge can say, with any sense of
objective certainty, that the emotional pain caused by the racist
rantings of a neo-Nazi speaking in front of the Skokie Village
Hall is automatically more damaging or long-lasting than is the
communication that one's spouse wants a divorce because the
spouse wants to marry one's best friend.52
In the Skokie litigation, neo-Nazis were allowed to march through an Illinois
community (Skokie) with a large Jewish population.53 Although some of
Skokie's residents were Holocaust survivors, the court, by declining to grant
injunctive relief, explicitly rejected the claims of emotional harm brought by
the plaintiffs.54 Analyzing the reaction to the Skokie demonstrations,
Goldberger suggests that "in many cases the pain from racist, sexist, and
ethnically offensive speech may be alleviated by the capacity of offensive
speech to illuminate the ugliness of the speaker. This, in turn, makes the
speaker the target of criticism and hostility."55 Henry Louis Gates, Jr. believes
" Id. at 434 (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice Stevens is presumably referring to the Los
Angeles riots of 1992. See also id, at 416 ("Threatening someone because of her race or
religious beliefs may cause particularly severe trauma. ").
52 David Goldberger, Sources of Judicial Reluctance to Use Psychic Harm as a Basis for
Suppressing Racist, Sexist and Ethnically Offensive Speech, 56 BROOK. L. REv. 1165, 1209
(1991).
" Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197, 1199 (7th Cir. 1978).
14 Id. at 1206.
" Goldberger, supra note 52, at 1209.
[Vol. 35:53
SHAME, RAGE AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH
that gutter racial epithets "on many college campuses, to be candid, are more
likely to stigmatize the speaker than their intended victim.
5 6
Rosa Ehrenreich concedes that a victim of sexual harassment who is
targeted for discriminatory reasons may suffer more, because she is being
attacked doubly, as an individual and a woman; but then Ehrenreich also
entertains the contrary possibility, that discriminatory harassment
may, instead, diminish her individual suffering, because she may
feel better able to brush off the harassment precisely because she
knows that nothing she did or could have done would have
prevented it; she may feel empowered by her awareness that she
is integral to a broader struggle to demand that all women be
treated as full persons. 7
C. Elaborating on the Claim: A Shame/Rage Hypothesis
Although judges and scholars have made the claim that non-status-based
harassment is just as (or more) psychologically damaging as status-based
harassment, why might this be the case?5" The hypothesis this Article seeks
56 Henry Louis Gates, Jr., War of Words: Critical Race Theory and the First Amendment,
in SPEAKING OF RACE, SPEAKING OF SEX: HATE SPEECH, CIVIL RIGHTS, AND CIVIL LIBERTIES 17,
47 (1994).
57 Rosa Ehrenreich, Dignity and Discrimination: Toward a Pluralistic Understanding of
Workplace Harassment, 88 GEO. L.J. 1, 19-20 (1999).
" Free speech theory could benefit from a fuller account of the emotional harms from
aggressive communication. But seeR. George Wright, An Emotion-BasedApproach to Freedom
of Speech, 34 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 429 (2003). Fortunately, there is an increasing amount of
insightful literature on law and the emotions. See MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, HIDING FROM
HUMANITY: DISGUST, SHAME, AND THE LAW (2004); Goldberger, supra note 52; Eric A. Posner,
Law and the Emotions, 89 GEO. L.J. 1977 (200 1). Perhaps lack of awareness of mobbing (until
recently) in U.S. legal scholarship is partly a function of the privileged circumstances under
which American legal academics work, arguably making them largely immune from the
phenomenon (or at least its most damaging effects), including, for example: (1) near total
personal control over the schedule, style, and substance (micro-content) of their work; (2) the
ready availability of excellent alternative employment options; (3) relatively high salaries and
prestige; and of course, for the tenured, (4) lifetime job security. But see Michael L. Seigel, On
Collegiality, 54 J. LEGAL EDUC. 406, 416 (2004) ("[P]roblems with collegiality are more
prevalent in the academic setting than in other employment spheres, and legal academia appears
to experience the phenomenon at its highest levels."). But compare Gravois, supra note 20, who
argues that the job protection afforded by tenure, and the absence of clear performance
indicators, makes mobbing significantly more prevalent in academia.
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to explore is rooted in a distinction between the emotional harms from shame
and rage. First, if victims of status-based harassment may paradigmatically
react with rage to harassment (but not shame)--then targets of mobbing may
be more likely to experience shame. Second, at least according to this
hypothesis, shame is more psychologically harmful than rage.
Is this distinction tenable between the reactions of shame and rage to the
two different categories ofharassment? Webster's Dictionary defines "shame"
as "a painful emotion caused by consciousness of guilt, shortcoming, or
impropriety" or "a condition of humiliating disgrace or disrepute," and "rage"
as "violent and uncontrolled anger."59 Random House defines "shame" as "the
painful feeling arising from the consciousness of something dishonorable,
improper, ridiculous, etc., done by oneself or another," and "rage" as "angry
fury; violent anger."60 Shame and rage exist around a constellation of related
emotions. Shame is related to shyness, disgust, contempt, embarrassment,
humiliation, and guilt. Rage can be more extreme (fury), or milder (anger,
annoyance). It can be ossified powerfully (hate) or ossified mildly
(resentment).' If we had to place fear within either family, we would put it
with shame rather than anger. Indeed, some Australian aborigines used the
same word for fear and shame.62 It is fear that sometimes keeps us from
expressing rage, even allowing it to reach consciousness. Shame is a
shrinking, rage an expansion.
In her book-length treatment of shame and disgust in the law, Martha
Nussbaum argues that "a basic strategy to counter public shaming of a group
is the traditional civil rights strategy of nondiscrimination legislation."63 If this
59 MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1073, 962 (11 th ed. 2003).
60 THE RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLSH LANGUAGE 1758, 1579 (2d ed.
unabridged 1987).
61 See NUSSBAUM, supra note 58, at 203-11 (comparing shame and rage); WILLIAM IAN
MILLER, HUMILIATION: AND OTHER ESSAYS ON HONOR, SOCIAL DISCOMFORT, AND VIOLENCE
148-49 (1993) (making distinctions between the different emotions within the family in his
book-length treatment of humiliation: "Like shame and humiliation, embarrassment is also an
emotion of self-attention and self-consciousness. All three suppose some relation to a world in
which one's actions, one's appearance, one's very being are being judged. All three are
unpleasant and all three figure prominently in the social and psychic mechanisms of social
control.... If shame's genre is tragedy, and humiliation's is comedy, what could embarrassment
be if not also comedy.... Humiliation is dark, embarrassment light.").
62 Lester R. Hiatt, Classification of the Emotions, in AUSTRALIAN ABORIGINAL CONCEPTS
182-87 (Lester R. Hiatt ed., 1978), cited in MILLER, supra note 61, at 99-100.
63 NUSSBAUM, supra note 58, at 309. On the other hand, other authors have observed that
using the law to achieve equality may have a stigmatizing effect. See Christopher A. Bracey,
Race Jurisprudence and The Supreme Court: Where Do We Go From Here?, 7 U. PA. J. CONST.
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is the case, the emotional response to at least some protected category attacks
presumably changed over time, as these forms of harassment have lost formal
legitimacy through anti-discrimination law. Recall that before sexual
harassment was given legal redress, before it was effectively even widely
identified as a harm by Catharine MacKinnon and others--only relatively
recently-it was routinely dismissed as simply an annoyance of working life,
or as a kind of boyish pranksterism (unfortunately, of course, it still is in many
quarters).' Thus, the countless women (and occasional man) who suffered
from sexual harassment before it had been formally recognized were more
likely to be suffering from shame and humiliation (and less from anger) than
is true today, with the newfound public and legal recognition of the issue.
MacKinnon recently answered her own question as to whether a quarter
century of sexual harassment law had changed anything: "The experience has
been named, its injuries afforded the dignity of a civil rights violation....
Resentment of unwanted sex... [is] given more public respect. Women may
feel... less stigmatized and scared, more like freedom fighters and less like
prudes.'65  Later she adds that before laws had been enacted, sexual
harassment was "an experience of shame for victims that kept them
disempowered in the name of protection without protecting them."66 And
Abigail C. Saguy, an expert on the comparative approaches to harassment law
in France and the United States, argued that because sexual harassment law "is
less legitimate in France, victims arguably feel more shame about coming
forward., 67 Indeed, to those of us who were legally and culturally educated
over the past couple of decades about the nature and meaning of sexual
harassment in the United States, Saguy's description of the French version
proves striking. The French classify sexual harassment with rape, sexual
assault, and exhibitionism in their penal code, although there is also a civil
L. 669, 700 (2005) ("Dignitary interest in contemporary race jurisprudence also takes the form
of concern over the possible stigmatizing effects of being denoted the 'beneficiary' of a racial
classification.").
" See Schauer, supra note 15.
61 Catharine A. MacKinnon, DIRECTIONS IN SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAW, supra note 15, at
673.
" Id. at 674; see also Bracey, supra note 63, at 669, 671 ("The struggle for racial justice in
America, then, is perhaps best understood as a struggle to secure dignity in the face of sustained
efforts to degrade and dishonor persons on the basis of color. The concepts of dignity and
subordination are powerfully linked.").
67 Schultz et al., supra note 5, at 168; see also Abigail C. Saguy, What is Sexual
Harassment? From Capitol Hill to the Sorbonne, 27 T. JEFFERSON L. REv. 45, 48 (2004).
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version found in their labor code.68 As opposed to the United States, there is
no employer liability for sexual harassment, and it is not taken nearly as
seriously by human resource departments in French companies, for example.
According to Saguy, the French have been reluctant to import American
harassment jurisprudence-partly out of a disdain for U.S. cultural
imperialism, including what are widely seen in France as hypocritically
puritanical attitudes about sex.69 The quote Saguy provides from a French
woman named Sophie, with twenty years of experience working in French
corporations, is especially telling, and my intepretation is that Saguy means it
to be representative rather than atypical:
I have never been harassed in the real sense of the term, where a
person ends up tyrannizing you. It's true that we are pestered;
it's true that there are men who take advantage of the situation
and pinch your rear in the elevator, but that's different ....
Where I feel really attacked is when someone puts a knife to my
throat and tells me, 'if you don't do it, you'll lose your job.'70
But again, for those French women (unlike Sophie) who would want to seek
redress for such behavior, the lack of cultural support would imply the
likelihood of greater shame on their part, compared to their American
counterparts.
Our capacity for shame must be rooted in our evolutionary past, as with all
emotions.7 Paul Gilbert writes:
The evolutionary root of shame is in a self-focused, social threat
system related to competitive behavior and the need to prove
oneself acceptable/desirable to others .... The evolutionary
precursors for shame can be traced back to the way all animals
must be able to detect and cope with social threats. For many
animals, attentiveness to conspecifics that could inflict harm, and
are threats to them, is highly adaptive, and social anxiety, flight,
68 The French criminalized "moral harassment" (mobbing) in 2002. See Saguy, supra note
67, at 47-48.
69 Id. at 53-54.
70 See id. at 45-46.
71 Paul Gilbert, Evolution, Social Roles and the Differences in Shame and Guilt, Soc. RES.,
Winter 2003, available at http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi-m2267/is_4_70/ai_1 129
43741 (internal citations omitted).
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or submission/appeasement are salient defenses. Social threats
(unlike nonsocial threats) often involve communicating signals
that impact on the state of mind of the threatening other(s); for
example, a submissive display may be sufficient to stop a more
dominate [sic] from seriously attacking a subordinate. Although
shame requires a symbolic sense of self, it too is regulated by
social threats and automatic defenses to protect the self from
threats posed by others. Indeed, there is now evidence that
shame can act as an inner warning signal of threats and
challenges to the self, with a triggering of automatic defenses--
especially desires to escape (flight) and submissive behavior,
anger, and concealment.
7 2
But Gilbert acknowledges the enormous significance of the role of historically
and culturally specific values in giving meaning to "social emotions" like
shame:
The power of shame to "construct" social values and behaviors
can be seen in how it affects social interactions. For example,
female promiscuity is far more acceptable in, for example,
wealthy California than a Taliban-controlled Afghanistan.
Divorce is easier in the West than it was 50 years ago, is less
shameful, and men are increasingly expected, by law, to provide
for offspring. For a thousand years Chinese foot binding, by
which the feet of infant girls were broken and bound, thus
sentencing them to a life of pain, was regarded as creating
attractiveness as marital partners, status, control, and sexual
attractiveness. These behaviors clearly do not lie in any innate
or genetic process, but emerge from value systems loosely linked
to sexual strategies. Importantly, Mao Zedong outlawed foot
binding because women with bound feet made poor soldiers or
workers. Within 20 years, women with bound feet, who were
once esteemed, were now stigmatized as parasites on society.73
72 Id.; see also Toni M. Massaro, The Meanings of Shame: Implications for Legal Reform,
3 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y& L. 645,658-59 (1997) ("In other words, shame and pride are one part
of a larger, biologically driven social structure of status and competition that results from the
species' struggle for survival. Shame is simply 'a way of discouraging the repeat of status-
reducing behaviors, however status may be defined by a particular social group.' ").
" Gilbert, supra note 71; see also Massaro, supra note 72, at 658 ("That shame can link up
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Gilbert includes homosexuality as another example of culturally imposed
shame, because although it is seen as shameful in some cultures, in others (e.g.,
ancient Sparta), it has been approved of or encouraged.74 But the general point
is that shame is necessarily a highly politicized emotion because if we have
violated whatever the contemporary social norms happen to be, evolution has
prepared us to naturally feel "prepared for contrition"--the state of low-grade
social anxiety or fear that is experienced as shame.
D. Mobbing, Ostracism and Shame
Ostracism and shame play important roles in mobbing theory. Most
technical definitions of mobbing do not require a "ganging up" dynamic (to
constitute a legal violation, for example), but isolation from a group is a
significant element in the overall analysis. For example, for the International
Labour Organization (ILO), mobbing "involves ganging up on ... a targeted
employee and subjecting that person to psychological harassment. Mobbing
includes constant negative remarks or criticisms, isolating a person from social
contacts, and gossiping or spreading false information."75
Academic attention to mobbing highlights the importance of exclusion and
isolation. Sociologist Kenneth Westhues defines mobbing as "an impassioned,
collective campaign by co-workers to exclude, punish, and humiliate a targeted
worker. Initiated most often by a person in a position of power or influence,
mobbing is a desperate urge to crush and eliminate the target., 76 The word
appears in descriptions of animal behavior, especially ornithology, where it
describes the behavior of a group of birds attacking a single bird.77 Leymann,
who is credited with borrowing the term "mobbing" from the field of animal
ethology to human workplace behavior, defined it as "hostile and unethical
communication, which is directed in a systematic way by one or a few
so variably to external inputs makes Darwinian sense, insofar as this enables the individual to
adapt to his or her social surroundings. Consequently, shame's variability does not necessarily
undermine the claim that shame is innate.").
" Gilbert, supra note 71.
71 Int'l Labour Org., When Working Becomes Hazardous: Punching, Spitting, Swearing,
Shooting: Violence at Work Goes Global, WORLDOFWORK, Sept.-Oct. 1998, available athttp://
www.ilo.org/public/english/bureau/inf/magazine/26/violence.htm.
76 Kenneth Westhues, At the Mercy of the Mob, OHS CANADA, Dec. 2002, at 30-36,
available at http://www.arts.uwaterloo.ca/-kwesthue/ohs-canada.htm.
" See, e.g., I.G. McLean, J.N.M. Smith & K.G. Stewart, Mobbing Behaviour, Nest
Exposure, and Breeding Success in the American Robin, 96 BEHAVIOUR 171 (1986).
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individuals mainly towards one individual who, due to mobbing, is pushed into
a helpless and defenseless position, being held there by means of continuing
mobbing activities.""
So, it seems that the European approach to harassment implicitly
acknowledges the power of ostracism, usually independent of the categories
of gender or race so important to American jurisprudence. In comparing the
two approaches, Friedman and Whitman have written:
It hurts to be shunned in Europe, and it hurts so much that the
law must come in.... That does not mean that individual
Americans are incapable of thinking about such issues. There is
no law of radical legal cultural differences-no legal Sapir-
Whorf hypothesis-that holds that the individual is imprisoned
in the mental cage created by the law of his country. What it
means is that ideas like the theory of mobbing simply do not fall
on fertile cultural soil in the U.S. as they do in countries like
Sweden, France or Germany.79
My own view is that more work needs to be done to determine whether
American culture is generally more dismissive of "ostracism" per se as a
matter of legal concern; although in at least one area of law, there are results
that support Whitman's argument: in claims for retaliation following
allegations of harassment under Title VII, American courts have not been very
receptive to ostracism as a sufficiently adverse employment action. 0 Some
78 Heinz Leymann, The Content and Development of Mobbing at Work, 5 EUR. J. WORK &
ORG. PSYCHOL. 165, 168 (1996), available at http://www.ste.uji.es/mobbing/LeymannEI.pdf.
Westhues writes about Leymann's application to adults of the term that had previously been
limited to animals and children:
Leymann's contribution was to document beyond any doubt the same reality
among adults, even in the cool, rational, professional, bureaucratic, policy-
governed setting of a workplace. The tactics differ. Workplace mobbing is
normally carried out politely, without any violence, and with ample written
documentation. Yet even without the blood, the bloodlust is essentially the
same: contagion and mimicking of unfriendly, hostile acts toward the target;
relentless undermining of the target's self-confidence; group solidarity against
one whom all agree does not belong; and the euphoria of collective attack.
Westhues, supra note 76.
79 Friedman & Whitman, supra note 5, at 270 (emphasis added). But see Maxine D.
Goodman, Human Dignity in Supreme Court Constitutional Jurisprudence, 84 NEB. L. REV. 740
(2006).
" I should be clear that these are not Whitman's points, but my own. See, e.g., Marrero v.
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courts have been concerned that holding an employer liable on ostracism
grounds might violate the First Amendment right to associate freely.8
The general relationship between social power and social alliances is much
studied and highly interdisciplinary. 2 Many cultures have employed ostracism
as an extreme form of criminal punishment, from the ancient Greeks (who gave
us the term from ostrakismos), to tribal civilizations like the Pathans of
Goya of Puerto Rico, Inc., 304 F.3d 7 (1st Cir. 2002); Brooks v. City of San Mateo, 229 F.3d
917, 929 (9th Cir. 2000) ("Because an employer cannot force employees to socialize with one
another, ostracism suffered at the hands of coworkers cannot constitute an adverse employment
action."); Manning v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 127 F.3d 686, 692 (8th Cir. 1997) (employment
actions that were sufficiently adverse to sustain a retaliation claim include tangible change in
duties, or working conditions that constituted a material employment disadvantage or an ultimate
employment decision, such as termination, demotion, reassignment, but not merely hostility,
disrespect, or ostracism); Strother v. S. Cal. Permanente Med. Group, 79 F.3d 859, 869 (9th Cir.
1996) ("[M]ere ostracism in the workplace is not enough to show an adverse employment
decision."). Similarly, ostracism and disrespect by supervisors do not rise to the level of an
adverse employment claim. See, e.g., Manning, 127 F.3d at 692-93; see also Miller v.
Aluminum Co. of Am., 679 F. Supp. 495,505 (W.D. Pa. 1988) ("snubbing" by supervisors does
not amount to unlawful retaliation). Finally, shunning of plaintiff by co-workers at the direction
of a supervisor does not, as a matter of law, rise to the level of an adverse employment action for
Title VII purposes. See Scusa v. Nestle U.S.A. Co., 181 F.3d 958, 969 (8th Cir. 1999); Munday
v. Waste Mgmt. ofN. Am., Inc., 126 F.3d 239,243 (4th Cir. 1997); Kim v. Nash Finch Co., 123
F.3d 1046, 1060 (8th Cir. 1997); Miller, 679 F. Supp. at 505 (plaintiff must show more than
occasional unkind words, snubs and perceived slights by defendant's agents to prove adverse
employment action).
81 "The First Amendment prevents the government, except in the most compelling
circumstances, from wielding its power to interfere with its employees' freedom to believe and
associate." DiRuzza v. County of Tehama, 206 F.3d 1304, 1308 (9th Cit. 2000) (emphasis in
original) (quoting Rutan v. Republican Party of Ill., 497 U.S. 62, 76 (1990)).
82 See, e.g., Michael Harris Bond, Culture and Aggression-From Context to Coercion, 8
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. REV. 62 (2004), available at http://www.leaonline.com/doi/abs/
10.1207/s 15327957pspr080l_3; Tod Chambers, Participation as Commodity, Participation as
Gift, AM. J. BIOETHICS, Spring 2001, at 48; Neil Fligstein, Social Skill and the Theory of Fields,
19 Soc. THEORY 105 (2001); Robert Paynter, Historical and Anthropological Archaeology:
Forging Alliances, 8 J. ARCHAEOLOGICAL RES. 1 (2000); Hayagreeva Rao, Calvin Morrill &
Mayer N. Zald, Power Plays: How Social Movements and Collective Action Create New
Organizational Forms, 22 RES. IN ORG. BEHAVIOR 239 (2000), available at http://webuser.
bus.umich.edu/organizations/smo/protected/resources/raomorrillzald.pdf; Hean Tat Keh & Seong
Y. Park, An Expanded Perspective on Power in Distribution Channels: Strategies and
Implications, 8 INT'L REV. RETAIL DISTRIBUTION & CONSUMER RES. 101 (1998); Marion K.
Underwood et al., An Observational Study of Social Exclusion Under Varied Conditions:
Gender and Developmental Differences, 75 CHILD DEV. 1538 (2004); Kristien Van Laere &
Aime Henne, Social Networks as a Source of Competitive Advantage for the Firm, 15 J.
WORKPLACE LEARNING 248 (2003).
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Pakistan and the Slavic tribes of Montenegro.83 The Amish version is
translated as "shunning."84 The necessity of alliances, and the dangers of
isolation, inform everything from international relations theory to corporate
business strategy. In an article discussing, inter alia, the biological origins of
ostracism as a form of punishment, Judge Hoffman and Professor Goldsmith
remind us that
one need not be an anthropologist, an historian, or Amish to
know that ostracism is continuously operating in every set of
human relations in all cultures. Every time we give our spouse
the silent treatment, or send an unruly student to the principal's
office, or don't invite one of our co-workers to our usual Friday
lunch, we are practicing mild forms of ostracism.85
Kipling Williams, an Australian academic and author of an extensive study
on ostracism, argues that it is a unique form of aggression because it threatens
all four of the fundamental human needs identified in psychological literature:
to belong, to control, to maintain high self-esteem, and to buffer against the
realization of one's mortality and meaningless existence.86 He observes: "The
additional feature that explains ostracism's apparent ubiquity and frequency
is that sources can employ it without a great deal of effort and in such a way
that they can deny that they are doing it."87
Formal and informal social alliances provide structural defenses against
mobbing. Membership in peer networks allows retribution through gossip and
other norms of social control.88 Racial and sexual minorities have written
extensively about the use of ostracism as a tool of workplace
discrimination-often drawing from their own personal experiences.89 Indeed,
83 KIPLING D. WLIAMS, OsTRACIsM: THE POWER OF SILENCE 7-8 (2001).
84 Id.
8" Morris B. Hoffman & Timothy H. Goldsmith, The Biological Roots of Punishment, 1
OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 627, 637 (2004).
86 WILLIAMs, supra note 83, at 245. "Our sense of connection and belonging is severed; the
control we desire between our actions and outcomes is uncoupled; our self-esteem is shaken by
feelings of shame, guilt, or inferiority; and we feel like a ghost, observing what life would be like
if we did not exist." Id. at 6.
87 Id. at 245. See also Beth A. Quinn, The Paradox of Complaining: Law, Humor, and
Harassment in the Everyday Work World, 25 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 1151 (2000).
88 For a discussion of the evolution of such networks, see ROBIN I.M. DUNBAR, GROOMING,
GOSSIP AND THE EVOLUTION OF LANGUAGE (1996).
89 See Martha Chamallas, Structuralist and Cultural Domination Theories Meet Title VII."
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we might view the growth of Title VII "hostile environment" harassment
protection as partially flowing from a recognition of the need to avoid
discrimination-based ostracism. In this sense, anti-discrimination law
redresses numerical imbalances in workforces so that ostracism on status-based
grounds becomes (at least numerically) less possible.
In sum, then, one wonders if European anti-mobbing law recognizes a
psychological truth that U.S. harassment law implicitly dismisses: that being
in a group, any group, is one of the best defenses against harassment occurring
in the first place, and if it does occur, it is one of the best emotional defenses
against its damaging effects. Mobbing is defined as group harassment of an
ostracized individual.9° Such an individual is more likely to feel shame than
rage, according to mobbing theory.9 Strong social alliances, whether in the
workplace, university, or school, provide a bulwark against feeling shame, and
participation in these alliances helps individuals replace shame with the
arguably healthier emotion of anger. There is an apparent irony here: the
Europeans might see the term "protected group" as redundant for purposes of
harassment law, since a group (any cohesive social group--regardless of its
composition) is by definition afforded greater protection-sociologically,
organizationally, and psychologically, if not legally.92
Some Contemporary Influences, 92 MICH. L. REV. 2370 (1994); Tristin K. Green,
Discrimination in Workplace Dynamics: Toward a Structural Account of Disparate Treatment
Theory, 38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 91 (2003); Nancy J. Reichman & Joyce S. Sterling,
Recasting the Brass Ring: Deconstructing and Reconstructing Workplace Opportunities for
Women Lawyers, 29 CAP. U. L. REV. 923 (2002); Pamela J. Smith, Failing to Mentor Sapphire:
The A ctionability ofBlocking Black Women from Initiating Mentoring Relationships, 10 UCLA
WOMEN'S L.J. 373 (2000).
90 See discussion supra Part II.D.
9' See discussion supra Part II.C.
92 This observation is limited to the institutional setting (workplaces and so on). With
respect to speech outside of the workplace harassment context, the American approach cannot
generally be stereotyped as "status-based" and the European as "non-status-based." Indeed, it
is only because the Europeans lack any real equivalent to our First Amendment, defacto if not
dejure, that they are able to enforce national rules against racial and religious "hate speech"
(e.g., public arena speech that inflames "status-based" divisions) to a degree that would be
impossible under U.S. free speech law as currently interpreted. See Winfried Brugger, Ban On
or Protection of Hate Speech? Some Observations Based on German and American Law, 17
TuL. EuR. & Civ. L.F. 1, 21 (2002) ("The American legal system prohibits hate speech as late
as possible--only when an imminent danger of illegal acts exist [sic]. German jurisprudence
cracks down on hate speech as early as possible."). See generally John C. Knechtle, When to
Regulate Hate Speech, 110 PENN ST. L. REV. 539 (2006).
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E. Comparing the Damage: Shame v. Rage
Is shame more emotionally damaging than rage? Silvan Tomkins, a pioneer
in the study of shame, writes: "While terror and distress hurt, they are wounds
inflicted from the outside which penetrate the smooth surface of the ego; but
shame is felt as an inner torment, a sickness of the soul."9 3 Michael Lewis tells
us that with shame, "the self is seen as small, helpless, frozen, emotionally
hurt."'94 In the tradition of the Abrahamic religions, shame (not guilt, anger,
envy, greed, fear, etc.) is the emotion that begins the very story of humankind.
Paradise is a place without shame; before Adam and Eve are expelled from the
Garden of Eden, they "were not ashamed."95
Most of the attention to shame in legal literature comes from a discussion
of shaming penalties, e.g., car bumper stickers that attest to a drunk driving
conviction, or publishing names ofjohns in the local newspaper. Discussing
the legitimacy of such penalties, Sharon Lamb distinguishes anger from fear:
In Western society, anger and outrage are more acceptable
emotions to individuals than fear because as one experiences
anger and outrage, and one has the option to act on those
feelings, one often feels powerful. For Westerners, anger and
outrage are associated with strength rather than weakness.., in
the United States, one need only look at the last few decades
worth of Schwarzenegger movies to understand that anger is
action. It is force.96
She goes on to say that anger offers superiority and strength: "In experiencing
anger, we rarely feel like 'the victim.' In fact, therapy with victims frequently
involves getting in touch with one's anger as a form of self-empowerment." '97
David Goldberger provides an enlightening example of how anger is not
recognized as being as harmful as other kinds of emotional reactions-and that
plaintiffs (or at least their lawyers) know this when claiming damages:
93 Massaro, supra note 72, at 645.
9' Michael Lewis, The Role of the Self in Shame, Soc. RES., Winter 2003, at 231.
" Genesis 2:25 (King James).
96 Sharon Lamb, The Psychology of Condemnation: Underlying Emotions and Their
Symbolic Expression on Condemning and Shaming, 68 BROOK. L. REv. 929, 937 (2003).
" Id. See also Posner, supra note 58, at 1979 ("An angry person feels a kind of warmth and
agitation....").
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[A]nger is easily confused with pain. As a result, an offended
listener may be tempted to assert that he has been harmed even
though he is instead experiencing anger. This is encouraged by
the law's tendency to be more sympathetic to redressing harm
than to redressing anger. The distorting impact of an angry desire
for retaliation on the assessment of harm is illustrated in the
events that preceded the filing of Hustler Magazine v. Falwell.
During a press interview, the plaintiff Jerry Falwell told reporters
that he was riding on an airplane when he first saw the offensive
ad parody and that as a result of reading it, he was deeply hurt
and incensed. However, the actions that he took following the
reading of the parody make him sound more like an angry person
than an aggrieved one. He stated that following his reading of
the Campari parody, "I landed in Lynchburg, called [attorney]
Roy Grutman and said, 'Get him.' " His lawyer responded by
filing a lawsuit premised in large part on the claim that Falwell
had suffered intentionally inflicted emotional harm.98
The case law is mixed, and generally only implicit, when discussing the
comparative psychological harm from different negative emotions, an issue
that arises, for example, when courts ascertain damage claims. For example,
Texas law apparently considers shame more painful than anger:
[T]he term 'mental anguish' implies a relatively high degree of
mental pain and distress. It is more than mere disappointment,
anger, resentment or embarrassment, although it may include all
of these. It includes a mental sensation of pain resulting from
such painful emotions as grief, severe disappointment,
indignation, wounded pride, shame, despair and public
humiliation."9
Alabama courts have cited Black's Law Dictionary for the authority that shame
is a more "poignant and painful emotion" than anger. 0
98 Goldberger, supra note 52, at 1200-01.
9 Gant v. Dumas Glass and Mirror, Inc., 935 S.W.2d 202, 209 (Tex. App. 1996) (emphasis
added); see also Phar-Mor, Inc. v. Chavira, 853 S.W.2d 710, 712 (Tex. App. 1993).
11 See, e.g., Volkswagen of Am., Inc. v. Dillard, 579 So. 2d 1301, 1305-06 (Ala. 1991).
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It is also worth recalling a common justification of strong free speech
guarantees: the notion of the "safety valve"--that freedom of expression
allows for resentments and disagreements to be aired, rather than bottled up to
putrefy."'l The safety valve rationale for free speech implicitly prefers rage to
shame or humiliation; shame is hidden, silent, dangerous, festering, and
private. Rage can be expressed; it is an inherently public emotion, and can be
met (with calm tolerance, or counter-rage) when released. When bottled up,
rage is dangerous, but when it is bottled up, it is more likely to be entwined
with the emotion of shame. Thomas Scheff, who has written of the hidden
nature of shame in the context of shaming penalties, claims that discussing (at
conferences, for example) shame dynamics as a major factor is difficult
"because of the repression and suppression of shame in Western societies."'0 2
Scheff adds that "shame is subject to disguise and hiding in modem
societies.., one can feel shame about shame, and shame about that, and so on,
without end. This idea that one can be ashamed of being ashamed leads to the
concept of continuous loops of shame.... ,,'03
'0' See, e.g., NAT HENTOFF, FREE SPEECH FOR ME - BUT NOT FOR THEE: HOW THE AMERICAN
LEFT AND RIGHT RELENTLESSLY CENSOR EACH OTHER 18-41 (1992); see also Richard Delgado
& David H. Yun, Pressure Valves and Bloodied Chickens: An Analysis of Paternal Objections
to Hate Speech Regulation, 82 CAL. L. REV. 871 (1994).
02 Thomas J. Scheff, Honor and Shame: Local Peace-Making Through Community
Conferences (Aug. 4, 1997), http://www.soc.ucsb.edu/faculty/scheff/6.html.
103 Thomas J. Scheff, Community Conferences: Shame and Anger in Therapeutic
Jurisprudence, 67 REV. JUR. U.P.R. 97, 106 (1998).
For two millennia, Eurocentric societies have been nourishing values on
freedom, individual rights, human dignity, and tolerance.... In my lectures
on workplace mobbing, I sometimes say there are three basic appetites in a
normal person: for food, for sex, and for humiliating somebody else. Our
civilization affirms the first two cravings and facilitates their satisfaction. The
third craving is taboo .... [W]e are sometimes gripped by the eliminative
impulse, lust to put another down, but our hands are tied by rules protecting
human dignity.... The result is camouflage, subterfuge, self-deception,
denial, disguise, circumlocution, labyrinthine plots-much like the antics of
Catholic priests who are overcome by sexual desire in an organization that
forbids them to satisfy it. Ren6 Girard, arguably today's most perceptive
analyst of the eliminative impulse, calls it the 'persecutory unconscious.' ...
Girard describes 'a new level of cunning,' wherein we practice 'a hunt for
hunters of scapegoats. Our society's obligatory compassion authorizes new
forms of cruelty.'
Westhues, supra note 16, at 1-2. If the imposition of humiliation and shame are hidden, their
emotional and social consequences often are as well.
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Ill. THE REBUTTAL: STATUS-BASED HARASSMENT IS MORE
PSYCHOLOGICALLY HARMFUL
A. The Rebuttal by the Supreme Court
Are the Europeans more psychologically sophisticated in their emphasis on
mobbing, instead of on "status-based" harassment? In particular, is there
something "qualitatively unique"--to use Justice Stevens' minority view in
R.A. V-about the psychological and other harms from status-based speech that
make it less deserving of constitutional protection? If a majority of the R.A. V.
justices (in a 5 to 4 split) signed on to Scalia's view that-at least in the
"fighting words" context-claims of greater psychological harm from status-
based speech were mere "wordplay," they appeared to reverse their view about
the nature of such harm in Wisconsin v. Mitchell."° In Mitchell, the
constitutionality of Wisconsin's enhancement penalty for bias crimes was
challenged." 5 Writing for a unanimous court, Rehnquist claimed, "the
Wisconsin statute singles out for enhancement bias-inspired conduct because
this conduct is thought to inflict greater individual and societal harm. For
example, according to the State and its amici, bias-motivated crimes are more
likely to provoke retaliatory crimes, inflict distinct emotional harms on their
victims, and incite community unrest. '
The reason given by the Court for requiring content neutrality in R.A. V but
not in Mitchell was that the former involved government regulation of speech,
while the latter involved special treatment of conduct."°7 It is an established
principle of First Amendment jurisprudence that conduct receives less
constitutional protection than speech, so the Court's distinction is technically
consistent with its earlier rulings on this issue. Yet what does the
speech/conduct distinction have to do with the status-based/non-status-based
emotional harm distinction? The Court does not elaborate, but it seems
incongruous to dismiss the distinction between the two kinds of emotional
harms in a speech case (R.A. V) while giving it credence in a conduct case
(Mitchell). To borrow Scalia's example in R.A. V., no qualitative difference in
emotional harm can be alleged between calling someone a "papist" (which
would presumably have been illegal under the St. Paul ordinance) rather than
104 508 U.S. 476 (1993).
105 Id.
"o Id. at 487-88 (emphasis added).
107 Id. at 483-87.
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an "anti-Catholic bigot" (presumably not illegal).'s Yet if one uses these same
terms in the context of a bias-motivated crime under the Wisconsin statute
(say, while engaging in the conduct of punching a victim in the face), why
should the emotional harm distinction suddenly become plausible? It is not
enough to say that aggressive conduct is itself usually more psychologically
damaging than aggressive speech; we would have to assume some kind of
multiplier effect, presumably. But if the distinction is null (R.A. V.) then any
multiplier of such distinction should also be null. In sum, there can only be an
inconsistency between Scalia's position in R.A. V and his view in Mitchell-at
least with respect to the claim about comparative psychological harm.
The issue of psychological harm from "status-based" harassment was also
addressed by the Supreme Court in Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc. '09 Prior to
Harris, there had been a split in the Courts of Appeal as to whether plaintiffs
alleging "hostile environment" harassment under Title VII needed to show
psychological injury flowing from the status-based harassment."0  A
unanimous Supreme Court resolved the split in Harris, holding that no
requirement of psychological harm was needed to recover for sexual
harassment."' By removing such requirement, however, the Court was not
suggesting that psychological harm might not be the consequence of status-
based harassment; indeed, it explicitly left open the possibility that such harm
could be a part of a showing of "hostile" or "abusive" conduct. Nonetheless,
it is difficult to read Harris in a way that offers any further clarification of the
Court's view of the comparative psychological harm from status-based attacks.
Harris surely does not stand for the proposition that status-based harassment
is automatically psychologically damaging. Might it be interpreted conversely,
to rebut any suggestion that targets of status-based aggression are more
emotionally vulnerable to such aggression? Kathyrn Abrams has argued that
by rejecting the "serious psychological injury" requirement in sexual
harassment cases, the Supreme Court in Harris wanted to define a victim of
sexual harassment as not necessarily "psychologically damaged" or
108 R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 391-92 (1992).
109 510 U.S. 17 (1993).
"0 Noelle C. Brennan, Comment, Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment: The Hostile
Environment of a Courtroom, 44 DEPAUL L. REv. 545 n.298 (1995).
. Harris, 510 U.S. at 22 ("Title VII comes into play before the harassing conduct leads to
a nervous breakdown. A discriminatorily abusive work environment, even one that does not
seriously affect employees' psychological well-being, can and often will detract from employees'
job performance, discourage employees from remaining on thejob, or keep them from advancing
in their careers.").
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"compromised." '12  Abrams writes: "On a constructive level, the Court
projected an image of a victim of sexual harassment-perhaps a victim of
sexualized injury more generally-as a woman who is not entirely
compromised by her mistreatment, who is capable of acts of self-protection
and self-assertion, even in the midst of oppressive treatment.", 3 It is worth
observing that implicit in Abrams' analysis of Harris is the notion that the self-
assertion/anger/rage spectrum of emotions is a healthier response to sexual
harassment than the shame/fear/humiliation family of emotions.
In any case, if the Supreme Court has not provided a coherent analysis of
the comparative psychological harms from status-based harassment, it has been
generally reluctant to accept the regulation of (otherwise protected) speech
when such regulation is founded solely in a concern over emotional injury.'14
In Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, the Court created a "fighting words"
exception to the First Amendment when such words "by their very utterance
inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace.""' 5 However,
most observers believe the first prong of the Chaplinsky test-excluding from
First Amendment protection language which by its "very utterance inflict[s]
injury"--has not survived the test of time." 6 That is, the Court appears
increasingly willing to tolerate a fair degree of personal psychological harm
when free speech principles are at stake. The Court provided a long list of
authority to support its holding in R.A. V. that "[t]he mere fact that expressive
activity causes hurt feelings, offense, or resentment does not render the
expression unprotected."' 7 Still, in those cases in which the Court has shown
some solicitude for the psychic harm that may flow from speech, it certainly
has not explicitly recognized the emotional harms from rage as more
significant than the emotional harms from shame, or vice versa. Some
unprotected speech relates to concerns of rage rather than shame (fighting
words, incitement to violence); other unprotected speech is more likely to
involve the emotions of shame or disgust rather than rage (obscenity, child
112 Kathym Abrams, Subordination and Agency in Sexual Harassment Law, in DIRECTIONS
IN SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAW, supra note 15, at 116-17.
113 Id.
14 See Goldberger, supra note 52.
11 Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942).
116 Nadine Strossen, Regulating Racist Speech on Campus: A Modest Proposal?, 1990 DUKE
L.J. 484, 509 ("In Gooding, as well as in every subsequent fighting words case, the Court
disregarded the dictum in which the first prong of Chaplinsky's definition was set forth . .
.'. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 414 (1992).
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pornography);" 8 and still other forms of provisionally unprotected speech
(IED, invasion of privacy, defamation) can generate shame and/or rage, but
the Court has never overtly balanced the relative harms from these two
psychological reactions.
B. The Rebuttal by Legal Scholars
Legal scholars have argued that status-based verbal aggression is more
harmful. Arguing for an independent tort for racial epithets, Delgado and
Stefancic claim that racial insults differ fundamentally from generic insults
because of the unique emotional harm they cause victims by conjuring up "the
entire history of racial discrimination in this country."' 9 Delgado asserts that
"[r]acial insults, and even some of the words which might be used in a racial
insult, inflict injury by their very utterance. Words such as 'nigger' and
'spick' are badges of degradation even when used between friends; these
words have no other connotation."' 20 Likewise, Mari Matsuda distinguishes
hate speech as having a message that is: (1) of racial inferiority; (2) directed
against a historically oppressed group; and (3) persecutory, hateful, and
degrading.' 2 ' The pain caused by racist speech depends on a history of racial
subordination, according to Matsuda, and "[v]ictims of vicious hate
propaganda have experienced physiological symptoms and emotional distress
ranging from fear in the gut, rapid pulse rate and difficulty in breathing,
nightmares, post-traumatic stress disorder, hypertension, psychosis, and
suicide."' 122 Thomas Grey, who wrote a harassment code for Stanford
University that was later held unconstitutional on First Amendment grounds,
justified the code's "status-based" protections with the following argument:
"' The Court's test for obscenity in Miller defines a prurient interest as a "shameful ...
interest." Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 18 (1973).
119 RICHARD DELGADO & JEAN STEFANCIC, MUST WE DEFEND NAZIS?: HATE SPEECH,
PoRNoGRAPHY, AND THE NEW FIRST AMENDMENT 15-16 (1997).
120 Richard Delgado, Words That Wound: A Tort Action for Racial Insults, Epithets, and
Name-Calling, 17 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 133, 173-74 (1982), quoted in Goldberger, supra
note 52, at 1193.
121 Mari J. Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's Story, 87
MICH. L. REV. 2320, 2357 (1989).
122 Id. at 2336; see also Brendan P. Lynch, Personal Injuries or Petty Complaints?:
Evaluating the Case for Campus Hate Speech Codes: The Argument From Experience, 32
SuFFoLK U. L. REv. 613 (1999).
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[I]n this society at this time, [status-based] characteristics tend to
make individuals possessing them the target of socially pervasive
invidious discrimination. Persons with these characteristics thus
tend to suffer the special injury of cumulative discrimination:
they are subjected to repetitive stigma, insult, and indignity on
the basis of a fundamental personal trait. In addition, for most of
these groups, a long history closely associates extreme verbal
abuse with intimidation by physical violence, so that vilification
is experienced as assaultive in the strict sense. It is the
cumulative and socially pervasive discrimination, often linked to
violence, that distinguishes the intolerable injury of wounded
identity caused by discriminatory harassment from the tolerable,
and relatively randomly distributed, hurt of bruised feelings that
results from single incidents of ordinary personally motivated
name-calling.... '23
Kent Greenawalt writes about the First Amendment protections that might
be accorded to insults and epithets:
Although repetition of some personal insults, such as "you fat
slob," can undermine self-esteem, the effect of most such insults
is contained and dissipates fairly quickly. Epithets and more
elaborate slurs that reflect stereotypes about race, ethnic group,
religion, sexual preference, and gender may cause continuing
hostility and psychological damage.' 24
But Greenawalt goes further and argues that even within a particular protected
category (e.g., race and religion), certain epithets are more harmful than others:
" 'Honkey hurts a lot less than 'nigger,' and 'WASP' hurts a lot less than
'kike.' q1125 Charles Lawrence recounts a story told by one of his students, a
gay male from a working-class Irish family in Boston.'26 This student had been
called a "faggot" by a stranger in a subway and "found himself in a state of
123 Thomas C. Grey, Civil Rights Vs. Civil Liberties: the Case of Discriminatory Verbal
Harassment, J. HIGHER EDUC., Sept.-Oct. 1992, at 81.
124 Kent Greenawalt, Insults andEpithets: Are They Protected Speech?, 42 RUTGERS L. REV.
287, 302 (1990).
125 Id. at 300.
126 Charles R. Lawrence III, IfHe Hollers Let Him Go: RegulatingRacist Speech on Campus,
1990 DuKE L.J. 431, 455 (1990).
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semi-shock, nauseous, dizzy, unable to muster the witty, sarcastic, articulate
rejoinder he was accustomed to making."' 127 Lawrence then asked the student
if he had ever been called a "honkie," "chauvinist pig" or "mick," and "[h]e
said that he had been called some version of all three and that although he
found the last one more offensive than the first two, he had not
experienced--even in that subordinated role-the same disorienting
powerlessness he had experienced when attacked for his membership in the
gay community."' 128 Charles Lawrence argues that "[t]here is a great difference
between the offensiveness of words that you would rather not hear.., and the
injury inflicted by words that ... evoke in you all of the millions of cultural
lessons regarding your inferiority that you have so painstakingly
repressed.... 129
C. A Rebuttal of the Shame/Rage Hypothesis
It is worth emphasizing again that this Article is not concerned with
evaluating the significant non-emotional harms of status-based harassment or
"fighting words" or hate speech (that such harassment maintains gender
subordination, or is more likely to lead to riotous violence, or worsen social
tensions, and so on). But on the issue of psychological harm alone, this part
argues that we can rebut the claim that non-status-based harassment is more
emotionally harmful, at least based on the shame/rage hypothesis. First, the
shame/rage distinction is too imprecise, as a practical matter, because the two
emotions are often inextricably intertwined. James Gilligan, who has spent
thirty-five years investigating the causes and prevention of various forms of
violence in prisons and mental institutions, writes about the relationship
between shame and violent rage:
[T]he basic psychological motive, or cause, of violent behavior
is the wish to ward off or eliminate the feeling of shame and
humiliation-a feeling that is painful and can even be intolerable
and overwhelming-and replace it with its opposite, the feeling
of pride .... When people suffer an indignity, they become
127 Id.
128 Id. at 455-56.
129 Id. at461; see also Hugh Butts, The Mask ofHumanity: Racial/Ethnic Discrimination and
Post Traumatic Stress Disorder, 30 J. ACAD. PSYCHIATRIc L. 336, 339 (2002).
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indignant (and may become violent); our language itself reveals
the link between shame and rage. 3°
Humiliated fury is then a maj or cause of aggression. Because of the overlap
between shame and rage, and because either can remain unexpressed, or
expressed with social costs and consequences, comparing relative
psychological harms risks either futility or triviality.
It is also physiologically simplistic (and inaccurate) to characterize rage as,
prima facie, a medically healthier emotion than shame. Anger has been linked
to coronorary heart disease and hypertension, for example, even when it is
expressed rather than bottled up.' 3 ' Terry Smith provides a comprehensive and
detailed summary of the unique impact of racial discrimination on the physical
and psychological health of its victims, much of it based on relatively recent
scientific findings.3 2  Drawing on studies in the fields of medicine,
psychology, and sociology, Terry Smith argues that legal scholarship must
"reconceptualize discrimination in more realist terms, attempting to make the
law as vigilant against subtle discrimination as it purportedly is against overt
bias."'33
In addition, more than the emotions of shame and rage are involved in both
status-based and generic harassment. Emotion theorists generally agree on the
identification of the following fourteen universal, major emotions: joy, grief,
fear, anger, hatred, pity or compassion, envy, jealousy, hope, guilt, gratitude,
shame, disgust, and love.'34 Is rage/anger the major consequence of status-
based harassment? Consider that emotion theory suggests that it is possible for
'30 James Gilligan, Shame, Guilt and Violence, SOCIAL RESEARCH, Winter 2003, available
athttp://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi m2267/is_4_70/ai_ 112943739 ("I have been struck
by the frequency with which I received the same answer when I asked prisoners... why they
assaulted or even killed someone. Time after time, they would reply "because he disrespected
me" or "he disrespected my visitor [or wife, mother, sister, girl-friend [sic], daughter, etc.] ." ...
Whenever people use a word so often that they abbreviate it, it is clearly central to their moral
and emotional vocabulary. But even when they did not abbreviate it, references to the desire for
respect as the motive for violence kept recurring.").
31 Robert A. Anderson, Aspects ofAnxiety andAnger in Regard to CoronaryArtery Disease,
TOWNSEND LETTER FOR DOCTORS AND PATIENTS, Aug.-Sept. 2004; Susan A. Everson et al.,
Anger Expression and Incident Hypertension, PSYCHOSOMATIC MED., Nov.-Dec. 1998, at
730-31; Murray M. Mittleman et al., Triggering of Acute Myocardial Infarction Onset by
Episodes ofAnger, 92 CIRCULATION 1720 (1995).
132 Terry Smith, Everyday Indignities: Race, Retaliation, and the Promise of Title VII, 34
COLUM. HuM. RTs. L. REv. 529 (2003).
131 Id. at 552.
134 NUSSBAUM, supra note 58, at 23.
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a target of conduct potentially actionable as "quid pro quo" sexual harassment
to feel every single one of the major emotions (though some might be felt as
barely conscious, others painfully deep) in response to an offer by a supervisor
to exchange job benefits for sexual services: joy (at the prospect of the
benefits, before realizing they were attached to the services); grief (at recalling
the historical suffering of sexual exploitation of women); fear (at losing one's
job, or of being sexually assaulted); anger (for being viewed as a sexual object
rather than a worker); hatred (towards an employer that allows abusive
supervisors to remain); pity (towards the supervisor and/or towards oneself);
envy (towards others at work not so burdened as oneself and/or towards the
supervisor); hope (for a less exploitative working environment, for oneself, for
women, for humanity); guilt (for not immediately challenging an abuse of
authority); gratitude (that it could be worse); shame (at the indignity of the
sexualized offering): disgust (towards the supervisor); love (towards oneself
for the strength to endure and resist), and so on. Some of these emotions are
more culturally acceptable than others, of course, and some of them would be
rare in "quid pro quo" cases-but again, theoretically possible.' Most
importantly, rage is not the inevitable (or even largest) emotional consequence
of such harassment.
After amendments in 1991 to the Civil Rights Act (CRA), compensatory
damages for emotional harm have been allowed in Title VII cases.'3 6 Under
the CRA of 199 1, in cases of "unlawful intentional discrimination," recovery
maybe granted for "emotional pain, suffering, inconvenience, mental anguish,
loss of enjoyment of life, and other nonpecuniary losses." Plaintiffs have
claimed a range of specific emotional harms as a consequence of status-based
harassment under the CRA. 137  These include "embarrassment and
humiliation,"'3' being "highly upset,"'139 being "emotionally scarred," 4 ° and
being "very embarrassed, very belittled, very disgusted, hopeless, about two
inches high." 4 '
135 Presumably, if one felt only joy, or jealousy, for example, the requirement in Title VII
sexual harassment law that offers be "unwelcome" would unlikely be met.
136 Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991).
137 See Lewis R. Hagood, Claims of Mental and Emotional Damages in Employment
Discrimination Cases, 29 U. MEM. L. REv. 577 (1999).
138 Walker v. MacFrugals Bargains, Closeouts, Inc., 66 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1085
(E.D. La. Dec. 9, 1994).
139 Erebia v. Chrysler Plastic Prods. Corp., 772 F.2d 1250, 1252 (6th Cir. 1985).
140 Patterson v. P.H.P. Healthcare Corp., 90 F.3d 927, 940 (5th Cir. 1996).
141 Farpella-Crosby v. Horizon Health Care, 97 F.3d 803, 809 (5th Cir. 1996) (internal
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The range of psychological reactions in non-status-based harassment claims
also includes a complex brew of emotions, of which shame and humiliation
may play minor, or non-existent, roles. Although non-status-based harassment
is not recognized under Title VII, analogies are available in claims for
emotional harm in cases alleging the intentional infliction of emotional
distress. Comment j to Section 46 of the Restatement 2d of Torts for lIED
includes within emotional distress "all highly unpleasant mental reactions,
such as fright, horror, grief, shame, humiliation, embarrassment, anger,
chagrin, disappointment, worry, and nausea. ' 142 In South Dakota, jury
instructions defining "emotional distress" have included most of this same list
of emotions, although (for reasons unstated) they add "mortification," but drop
"nausea" and "chagrin."' 143
We can also make the common sense observation that people exchange
barbs and epithets with each other in an infinite variety of contexts, and if we
define "harassment" in its broadest sense as a kind of assaultive
communicative act, we would realize that the vast majority of such harassment
has nothing to do with status-based categories. Where would we find the best
examples of such harassment? Consider the language that (1) spouses, friends,
or enemies use when they are arguing; (2) parents use when they scold their
children; (3) automobile drivers use against other drivers who anger them; (4)
impatient restaurant patrons use when waiters disappoint them, and so on ad
infinitum. The target of such aggressive language may react with all sorts of
emotions (including shame and rage, of course). Is it plausible that along the
shame/rage continuum, status-based attacks are more likely to lead to rage
rather than shame, because of an arguable psychological strength gained from
group solidarity-whether actual or symbolic? Perhaps, but the issue of the
content of the harassment will often be dwarfed by the particular emotional
makeup of the target (temperamental sensitivity to slights, etc.) and the social
context (presence of onlookers, nature of relationship between the aggressor
and target, etc.) in which the harassment was communicated.
So, to summarize, how does all this relate to the justification for mobbing
laws? If an implicit assumption of the European approach to harassment is that
a non-status-based approach (mobbing) rests in part upon recognition of the
particular emotional damage (shame) that victims experience, then does the
above rebuttal diminish this justification? If shame is no worse than rage in
quotation marks omitted).
142 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. j (1965) (emphasis added).
143 Maryott v. First Nat'l Bank, 624 N.W.2d 96, 109 (S.D. 2001).
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our context, and there is insufficient evidence that victims of racial or sexual
harassment suffer more from rage than shame, does the European approach
lose force? Yes, but again, only with respect to the shame/rage hypothesis,
which is only one of the many issues in any comparative argument.'" In any
case, my intention is to throw out a trump card in the next part and argue that
the First Amendment must dominate any dispute over the relative
psychological harm from status-based harassment."'
IV. MOBBING AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH
This Part switches gears and asserts that mobbing laws are preferable
because they avoid the free speech problems inherent in a status-based
approach. But it is important to stress that a mobbing-centered approach by no
means eliminates harassment protection for certain categories.'46 A choice is
not necessary between offering redress for "status-based" harassment, and
offering no protection at all. Much--even most, in some contexts-mobbing
takes a "status-based" form, so these categories would come under a mobbing
umbrella. Moreover, as some European laws have done, mobbing legislation
might, in its most egregious forms, be enacted in the United States to create
criminal penalties. Such potential criminal penalties would apply equally (or
perhaps even more easily) in cases of sexual and racial mobbing. So a
mobbing scheme could in limited cases be more punitive than existing
protection against status-based harassment. What should make a prohibition
on mobbing uncontroversial is that a status-neutral approach does not involve
a zero-sum game. That is, moving from a "status-based" to a "status-neutral"
approach enlarges the pie rather than leads to battles over the size of
slices-and in this way should be less divisive than "status-based" fights over
144 See supra note 5.
145 If a decision were necessary, I would hazard the guess that the hypothesis can be
successfully rebutted. That is, assuming an empirical test could precisely measure comparative
emotional harm, I would predict that status-based harassment is, as a general rule, both
quantitatively worse and qualitatively unique on the issue of psychological harm.
146 A notable exception is quid pro quo sexual harassment, as opposed to hostile environment
harassment. In the former, sexual favors are requested as part of an employment decision by
someone in a supervisory position ("sleep with me or you're fired"). Quid pro quo harassment
should unquestionably be actionable under some form of redress, but it is arguably a form of
extortion or coercion--even if reasonably felt as harassment-and so fits uncomfortably into a
"mobbing" framework. See Gertrud M. Flemling & Richard A. Posner, Status Signaling and the
Law, with Particular Application to Sexual Harassment, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 1069 (1999); Hager,
supra note 24.
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issues such as legislative redistricting, affirmative action, or minority set-
asides.'4 7 A larger pie in this context is likely a less expensive pie as well, in
terms of both internal and external economic savings. 4 '
Moreover, enacting mobbing prohibitions in no way requires that existing
status-based, anti-discrimination legislation be made status-neutral. In fact, it
would be absurd to make anti-discrimination laws generic-for on what
grounds is discrimination even possible if not in the form of some kind of
category or status? In other words, if an employer was forbidden from
discriminating on any grounds, such employer could not make any hiring or
promotion decisions at all. But this same absurdity points to the historical
mistake of tying legal redress for harassment (which is about dignity) to anti-
discrimination legislation (which is about equality). As Mark Hager has
convincingly argued at length, "[d]iscrimination law as an anti-harassment
weapon is morally and legally confused, dubious in effectiveness, and deeply
troubling in its unintended consequences."' 49 Yet, although harassment should
be legally divorced from discrimination, the continued enforcement of, for
example, Titles VI, VII, IX, the Americans with Disabilities Act,' and other
status-based, anti-discrimination laws would not be unrelated as a practical
matter to the prevalence of status-based harassment. For example, the very
existence of anti-discrimination legislation may serve as formal recognition
that no shame is attached to a certain status, as Nussbaum has suggested. 5'
Moreover, by increasing the numbers of certain groups in employment sectors
where they are underrepresented, the chances of mobbing occurring (through
ostracism and isolation) are reduced.5 2 Rosa Ehrenreich, who favors a more
expansive understanding of harassment, has written about the dilution caused
by our current approach of combining discrimination law with harassment law:
'41 Yamada, supra note 11, at 507-08.
It is understandable and laudable that, given the history and continuing
experience of discrimination and difference in America, scholars are alert to
attempts to dilute or minimize the importance of these critical issues.
However, speaking as someone who remains actively involved in fighting
discrimination and bias, I believe there is plenty of room in our public and
scholarly discourse about the workplace to include bullying along with status-
based mistreatment.
148 See, e.g., Coleman, supra note 5.
... Hager, supra note 24, at 376.
150 Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1990).
15 1 NUSSBAUM, supra note 58.
"52 See supra note 89.
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Title VII was enacted primarily to remedy discrimination against
members of groups that had historically been excluded from
equal access to social, political, and economic power. While a
formalistic interpretation of what it means to be discriminated
against on the basis of sex may satisfy linguists, it undermines the
goals of Title VII. Title VII was designed to prevent women,
along with members of certain other disadvantaged groups, from
facing disproportionate barriers to workplace success-it was not
designed to protect men in the workplace from the abusive
behavior of other men.
53
For Ehrenreich, then, it follows that disentangling harassment law from
discrimination law permits us to simultaneously recognize the possibility of
harm from non-status-based harassment, without diminishing the reality of
historical discrimination against particular groups or within certain categories.
But the point elaborated on below is that mobbing prohibitions-ironically,
because they are of European origin-better satisfy American constitutional
requirements.
A. Content-Neutrality
Content-neutrality is the most important First Amendment advantage of
mobbing prohibitions over most existing attempts to regulate harassment in the
United States. A content-based government regulation is one that depends on
the message being communicated, and is presumptively invalid.'54 In R.A. V.,
the Court reiterated the rationale for content neutrality as "rais[ing] the specter
that the Government may effectively drive certain ideas or viewpoints from the
marketplace."' 55 Because mobbing prohibitions are content-neutral, rather than
153 Ehrenreich, supra note 5, at 62.
'5 See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992). See also Simon & Schuster, Inc. v.
Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105 (1991); Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312 (1988); Consol. Edison
Co. of N.Y. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 530 (1980); Police Dep't of Chicago v.
Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972); Geoffrey R. Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, 54 U. CHI. L.
REv. 46(1987).
15 R.A.V, 505 U.S. at 387 (quoting Simon & Schuster, 502 U.S. at 116); Leathers v.
Medlock, 499 U.S. 439, 448 (1991); FCC v. League of Women Voters of Cal., 468 U.S. 364,
383-84 (1984); Consol. Edison Co., 447 U.S. at 536; Mosley, 408 U.S. at 95-98.
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limited to certain categories of harassment (sex, race, religion, etc.), such
prohibitions should be preferred on constitutional grounds.'56
In educational settings, status-based approaches to harassment have been
explicitly held unconstitutional on content and viewpoint-based First
Amendment grounds.'57 The same has not been true for the private
employment context, but as the U.S. Court of Appeals in DeAngelis v. El Paso
Municipal Police Officers'Ass 'n observed:
Where pure expression is involved, Title VII steers into the
territory of the First Amendment. It is no use to deny or
minimize this problem because, when Title VII is applied to
sexual harassment claims founded solely on verbal insults,
156 The claim about mobbing prohibitions being "content-neutral" should not be interpreted
to suggest that Europeans have not also enacted status-based harassment prohibitions. Indeed,
every country in Europe also has status-based, anti-harassment legislation (on the books at least).
Friedman & Whitman, supra note 5, at 243. But specific anti-mobbing laws are best defined as
lacking content specificity in the American sense. For articles (in English) illustrating the
relative content-neutrality of some of these European laws, see generally David C. Yamada,
Workplace Bullying and the Law: Towards a Transnational Consensus?, in BULLYING AND
EMOTIONAL ABUSE IN THE WORKPLACE: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES IN RESEARCH AND
PRACTICE 399 (Stale Einarsen et al. eds., 2003); ABIGAIL SAGUY, WHAT IS SEXUAL
HARASSMENT?: FROM CAPITOL HILL TO THE SORBONNE (2003); Guerrero, supra note 5; Rachel
A. Yuen, Beyond the Schoolyard: Workplace Bullying and Moral Harassment Law in France
and Quebec, 38 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 625 (2005); Coleman, supra note 5, at 261-62.
157 See, e.g., Saxe v. State College Area Sch. Dist., 240 F.3d 200, 206 & n.6 (3d Cir. 2001)
(Alito, J.) (citation omitted).
But there is also no question that the free speech clause protects a wide
variety of speech that listeners may consider deeply offensive, including
statements that impugn another's race or national origin or that denigrate
religious beliefs. When laws against harassment attempt to regulate oral or
written expression on such topics, however detestable the views expressed
may be, we cannot turn a blind eye to the First Amendment implications.
... Indeed, a disparaging comment directed at an individual's sex, race, or
some other personal characteristic has the potential to create an "hostile
environment"-and thus come within the ambit of anti-discrimination
laws-precisely because of its sensitive subject matter and because of the
odious viewpoint it expresses .... Most commentators including those who
favor and oppose First Amendment protection for harassing speech, agree that
federal anti-discrimination law regulates speech on the basis of content and
viewpoint.
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pictorial or literary matter, the statute imposes content-based,
viewpoint-discriminatory restrictions on speech.'
Judge Edith Jones, writing for a unanimous Fifth Circuit in DeAngelis, went
on to state: "Whether such applications of Title VII are necessarily
unconstitutional has not yet been fully explored. The Supreme Court's offhand
pronouncements are unilluminating."' 59 The "offhand pronouncements" that
Judge Jones alludes to are dicta from R.A. V., in which Justice Scalia
unconvincingly tried to protect Title VII hostile environment harassment from
his own ruling in R.A. V., by adding this comment:
[W]ords can in some circumstances violate laws directed not
against speech but against conduct (a law against treason, for
example, is violated by telling the enemy the Nation's defense
secrets), a particular content-based subcategory of a proscribable
class of speech can be swept up incidentally within the reach of
a statute directed at conduct rather than speech. Thus, for
example, sexually derogatory "fighting words," among other
words, may produce a violation of Title VII's general prohibition
against sexual discrimination in employment practices. Where
the government does not target conduct on the basis of its
expressive content, acts are not shielded from regulation merely
because they express a discriminatory idea or philosophy. 60
Yet this statement-although legitimate enough as a claim about how a
majority of the Supreme Court currently envisions the reach of the First
Amendment-is merely a tautology about the Court's recognition of a
distinction between conduct and expression; it fails to address the mess
underlying the tautology. After all, it is the impact of the communication on
its target that hostile environment law seeks to regulate, and such harassment
is commonly carried out in the form of "pure" speech. Quite a few
commentators have argued that the majority opinion in R.A. V. must be seen as
constitutionally hostile to Title VII harassment law;'6 ' indeed, one such
158 51 F.3d 591, 596-97 (5th Cir. 1995).
1S9 Id. at 597 (citation omitted).
160 R.A. V, 505 U.S. at 389-90 (citations omitted).
" For a thorough critique of this dictum in R.A. V., see Ellen R. Peirce, Reconciling Sexual
Harassment Sanctions and Free Speech Rights in the Workplace, 4 VA. J. Soc. POL'Y & L. 127,
210-11 (1996).
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commentator was no less than Justice White himself, who wrote in his R.A. V.
concurrence that Justice Scalia's majority opinion "glosse[d] over the...
regulation governing hostile working environment, which reaches beyond any
'incidental' effect on speech."' 62
In the first years following the creation of Title VII "hostile environment"
harassment, there was almost no discussion-by judges or academics---of any
First Amendment dangers with this area of law. That has changed significantly
in recent years, as First Amendment scholar Frederick Schauer writes:
Fourteen years after Meritor, the situation looks quite different.
Hostile environment claims are now routinely met with First
Amendment defenses, and indeed the entire concept of hostile
environment sexual harassment is equally routinely challenged,
by commentators and pundits even if less often in the courts, as
an infringement of the First Amendment rights of the managers
and employees whose verbal and pictorial conduct has created
the hostile environment.
63
Robert Post has claimed that to the extent that sexual harassment laws involve
infringements of dignity (as opposed to equality), they "appear to raise some
of the same First Amendment concerns as do the dignitary torts," such as
defamation, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and invasion of
privacy."' 4 Post argues that New York Times v. Sullivan (and its progeny)
changed the view that the abusive communication regulated by these torts
should be considered conduct, rather than speech, at least within the realm of
"public discourse. '"165 Now, the dignitary torts still generally survive First
Amendment scrutiny in the workplace, as elsewhere, and the workplace is
obviously not our purest example of a setting for public discourse (although,
as Post agrees, it has elements thereof). Consequently, mobbing prohibitions
should survive First Amendment challenge--even in cases of mobbing
involving only speech. But eliminating content-specific (and de facto
viewpoint-specific) workplace speech regulations is now necessary to adapt to
this broader view of the free speech guarantees. In fact, because of their
162 R.A. V., 505 U.S. at 410.
163 Schauer, supra note 15, at 352.
'" Robert Post, Sexual Harassment and the First Amendment, in DIRECTIONS IN SEXUAL
HARASSMENT LAW, supra note 15, at 389.
165 Id.
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content-neutrality, prohibitions on mobbing qualify under First Amendment
doctrine as "time, place, and manner" regulations, which are valid if they "are
content-neutral, are narrowly tailored to serve a significant government
interest, and leave open ample alternative channels of communication."
166
B. Vagueness and Overbreadth
A regulation is facially overbroad if there is "a likelihood that the statute's
very existence will inhibit free expression" by "inhibiting the speech of third
parties who are not before the Court."'' 67  Saxe found a school district's
harassment code unconstitutional on First Amendment grounds, holding that
"[t]o render a law unconstitutional, the overbreadth must be 'not only real but
substantial in relation to the statute's plainly legitimate sweep.' " 68 Kingsley
Browne has highlighted the vagueness and overbreadth problems of Title VII
hostile environment law:
A broad definition of sexual and racial harassment necessarily
delegates broad powers to courts to determine matters of taste
and humor, and the vagueness of the definition of "harassment"
leaves those subject to regulation without clear notice of what is
permitted and what is forbidden. The inescapable result is a
substantial chilling effect on expression.
169
Moreover, because of employer liability under Title VII, the chilling effect is
exacerbated because employers have a powerful incentive to substantially
overregulate the speech of their employees. 7 '
Several substantive and procedural alternatives are available to reduce these
problems with overbreadth and vagueness: (1) requiring that the harassment
be "directed at" or "targeting" a victim;' (2) adding a "malice" component; 72
166 United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 177 (1983) (quoting Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry
Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983)).
167 Saxe v. State College Area Sch. Dist., 240 F.3d 200, 214 (3d Cir. 2001) (citing Members
of City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 799 (1984)).
161 Id. at 214 (quoting Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615 (1973)).
169 Kingsley Browne, The Silenced Workplace, in DIRECTIONS IN SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAW,
supra note 15, at 399.
170 Id.
171 Id. at 409-10 (calling the targeted standard an unquestionable improvement, but still
problematic, and preferring to eliminate employer liability). It is worth observing that Supreme
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(3) requiring evidence of physical or psychological harm; 73 (4) shifting to a
tort-based model;' 74 (5) limiting recovery to "one-to-one" abuse; 75 (6)
eliminating employer liability; 76 (7) adding a specific notice requirement (and
necessarily barring liability for first offences); (8) and so on.' 77 These options
have been discussed already in some detail by their proponents (and others).
Naturally, none of these alternatives are without disadvantages of their own.
Significantly, however, by redefining the boundaries for recovery under a
mobbing framework-in the pursuit of free speech principles-we would not
necessarily be reducing the viability of legitimate status-based claims
compared to their viability under existing law. And that is because the
theoretical collage of Title VII "hostile environment" law is not only over-
inclusive (and thereby often constitutionally troublesome), it is also under-
inclusive. Clever harassers may simply target women for harassment, but
carefully avoid any mention of sex or gender, making a plaintiff's case much
more difficult to prove. Alternatively, supervisors can avoid the
"discrimination because of sex" requirement of Title VII by targeting men and
women for equally offensive sexual harassment; or supervisors can be equally
abusive to all employees, on matters both sexual and non-sexual. 7
Court case law since Chaplinsky has also emphasized that "fighting words" be directed at an
individual.
'72 Model legislation drafted by Yamada, "The Healthy Workplace Bill" to address non-
status-based harassment, includes, inter alia, requirements of both "malice" ("the desire to see
another person suffer psychological, physical, or economic harm, without legitimate cause or
justification") and the presence of "tangible" (physical or psychological) harm. I hasten to add
that Yamada would keep existing status-based "hostile environment" Title VII harassment law,
and his model legislation, the Healthy Workplace Bill, would be supplemental. That is, he does
not envision his bill (which has been drafted for state level enactment) as a replacement to
current law. See Yamada, supra note 11.
173 Id. at 499. Note that some circuits required evidence of psychological harm before Harris
eliminated it.
114 See Hager, supra note 24; Mark M. Hager, Harassment and Constitutional Tort: The
Other Jurisprudence, 16 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 279, 320 (1999) [hereinafter Hager,
Harassment and Constitutional Tort].
171 See Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech, Cyberspace, Harassment Law, and the Clinton
Administration, 63 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBs. 299, 313 n.49 (2000).
176 Browne, supra note 169, at 409-10.
177 For a recent proposal for a model EU-wide mobbing definition, see Guerrero, supra note
5, at 495.
178 Although the decisions are inconsistent for these scenarios, strictly speaking, none ofthem
should constitute "discrimination because of sex." See Browne, supra note 169; Kyle F.
Mothershead, Note, How the "Equal Opportunity'" Sexual Harasser Discriminates on the Basis
of Gender Under Title VII, 55 VAND. L. REv. 1205 (2002).
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In this context, it is easier to understand why U.S. status-based harassment
regulations suffer from constitutional challenges of vagueness and
overbreadth: the stated purpose of the existing legal rules (to compensate,
deter, and punish discrimination against certain groups) has been confused
with the typically unstated purpose of the rules' common application (to
compensate, deter, and punish individual cruelty, sometimes calculated, often
gratuitous). The Oncale decision, in which the Court recognized same-sex
harassment as a form of discrimination, represents well the outcome of such
confused thinking. '79 After Oncale, many commentators realized the decision
inevitably led to theoretical confusion over results in the variety of subsets of
plaintiffs and offenders: compare the outcomes with a gay perpetrator/gay
victim, gay perpetrator/straight victim, straight perpetrator/straight victim
(teasing and offensiveness), straight perpetrator/gay victim (hostility and
persecution)." 0
So just what is it that we want to compensate for, deter, and punish? A
spacious reading of Title VII "hostile environment" harassment cases suggests
that many judges are quite prudently interested in some aspect of control over
both forms of social evil: invidious group discrimination and vicious
interpersonal cruelty-particularly in captive environments. But we need
distinct regulatory mechanisms for these different harms, or we end up with a
befuddled jurisprudence that (among other things) creates imprecision in an
area of law (free speech) where vagueness and overbreadth are particularly
problematic. The most effective way to avoid such problems for First
Amendment purposes, then, is to have clearly expressed aims. Statutory
interpretation depends upon an investigation into language and/or legislative
purpose. But since linguistic imprecision is inevitable in the highly contextual
and subtle arenas in which harassment occurs, legislative purpose must be
particularly well-defined.' Prohibitions against mobbing achieve this
improved precision of legislative purpose.
It might be useful in a concluding paragraph to bring together some of the
disparate and subtle points raised in this Article. I began by posing the
(increasingly common) question "why does the U.S. approach to harassment
law differ so much from that of other countries (and in particular, the
Europeans)?" Although I urge any interested reader to review the growing
' 9Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75 (1998).
ISO Hager, Harassment and Constitutional Tort, supra note 174, at 320.
'a' The definition of "malice," for example, is likely to be necessarily vague, but not in a way
that is as harmful to the boundaries of free speech as the vagueness of current doctrine.
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literature that offers a variety of explanations for this difference, I intentionally
focus in the first parts of the Article on a rather narrow hypothesis. That
hypothesis is multidimensional: first, it wonders whether "status-based"
harassment ("you girls belong in the kitchen not the boardroom") causes more
emotional pain than "generic" harassment ("you are a totally unqualified
moron"). If we could answer that question with great certainty, it seems to me
we might then favor the European or American version with more confidence.
But as we saw, jurists and academics disagree on this first point, although
sometimes without deep analysis. So I hypothesized that perhaps the
difference between the legal treatment of harassment ("mobbing," with which
the Europeans are primarily concerned and "status based," with which U.S.
law is concerned) is rooted in a fundamentally different emotional response to
the content of the two forms of aggression. Perhaps victims of status-based
harassment primarily feel rage, whereas targets of generic harassment
("mobbing") primarily feel shame. As a corollary to this point, it seemed
natural to wonder whether rage could be said to be somehow "worse" than
shame, or vice versa. Again, I presented arguments for and against these
points, but my purpose was not so much to resolve them, as it was to add some
new observations to the scholarly and legislative conversation (particularly in
the comparative law arena) on these issues. But then, in the fourth and final
part, my position gained more certainty, as I argued that fundamental free
speech principles (based on a consistent and honest view of their primacy
under contemporary U.S. First Amendment jurisprudence) argued strongly in
favor of the European approach to harassment, regardless of one's views of the
issues presented in the first three parts of the Article.
[Vol. 35:53
